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CHURCH TAXES AND THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING 
OF THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
MARK STORSLEE†  
Since the Supreme Court’s decision in Everson v. Board of Education, it has 
been widely assumed that the Establishment Clause forbids government from ‘aiding’ 
or subsidizing religious activity, especially religious schools. This Article suggests that 
this reading of the Establishment Clause rests on a misunderstanding of Founding-era 
history, especially the history surrounding church taxes. Contrary to popular belief, the 
decisive argument against those taxes was not an unqualified assertion that subsidizing 
religion was prohibited. Rather, the crucial argument was that church taxes were a 
coerced religious observance: a government-mandated sacrifice to God, a tithe. 
Understanding that argument helps to explain a striking fact about the Founding era 
that the no-aid theory has largely ignored—the pervasive funding of religious schools 
by both the federal government and the recently disestablished states. But it also has 
important implications for modern law. Most significantly, it suggests that where a 
funding program serves a public good and does not treat the religious aspect of a 




† Assistant Professor, Penn State Law School; McDonald Distinguished Fellow, Emory 
University School of Law. Thanks to Gary Adler, Larry Backer, Stephanie Barclay, Thomas Berg, 
Nathan Chapman, Donald Drakeman, Carl Esbeck, Steven Green, Philip Hamburger, Benjamin 
Johnson, Elizabeth Katz, Douglas Laycock, Ira Lupu, Jason Mazzone, Michael McConnell, Eugene 
Volokh, Lael Weinberger, and John Witte, Jr. for valuable conversations and criticisms. Thanks to 
the McDonald Fellows at Emory Law School and the Constitutional Law Colloquium at the 
University of Illinois School of Law for helpful workshops, and to Daniel Dicce and Diego Garcia 
for excellent research assistance. Finally, thanks to the editors of the University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review for their tireless work and insightful suggestions. All errors, of course, are my own. 
112 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 111 
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 112 
I. CHURCH TAXES AS COERCED TITHES ...................................... 120 
A. The Debate in Virginia ................................................................. 120 
B. The Origins of the Argument ......................................................... 136 
II. CHURCH TAXES AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS ............................... 150 
A. The Former Anglican Colonies ...................................................... 150 
B. The Middle States ........................................................................ 157 
C. The Federal Government .............................................................. 163 
III. IDENTIFYING CHURCH TAXES ................................................ 169 
A. The Role of Earmarks .................................................................. 170 
B. The Role of Individual Coercion ..................................................... 175 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS ................... 182 
CONCLUSION ................................................................................ 192 
 
INTRODUCTION 
No one likes paying for causes they find objectionable. The thought of 
subsidizing activities one does not like seems galling at best, an assault on 
freedom of conscience at worst. And given that fact, it is no wonder that the 
Supreme Court long ago read the Establishment Clause as containing a rule 
to that effect. In Everson v. Board of Education, Justice Hugo Black famously 
said that because the Clause forbids forcing citizens to pay for religion they 
oppose, “[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any 
religious activities or institutions . . . whatever form they may adopt to teach 
or practice religion.”1 In short, the Establishment Clause meant government 
could not “aid” religion, especially by subsidizing religious activity.2 
In Everson itself, the Court stopped short of applying the no-aid theory 
as broadly as its rhetoric suggested and upheld a program paying for bus rides 
to both secular and religious schools.3 But it eventually adopted the theory 
wholesale. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court held that the Establishment 
Clause forbade any government aid that had the “primary effect” of 
supporting religion.4 The main upshot was a ban on funding for K-12 religious 
schools, no matter the government’s purpose in providing funds. But as the 
century progressed, problems piled up. 
The first one involved the Free Exercise Clause. As interpreted in Lemon, 
the no-aid theory categorically forbade government from financing the 
religious activities of private citizens. Yet both before and after Lemon, the 
 
1 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
2 Id. at 15. 
3 Id. at 16. 
4 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)). 
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Court held that the Free Exercise Clause required providing things like 
unemployment benefits to citizens whose religious practice had made them 
ineligible.5 The no-aid theory thus seemed to imply that the Establishment 
Clause forbade exactly what the Free Exercise Clause required.6 
There were also difficulties in application. The no-aid theory prohibited 
any aid that subsidized religious activity regardless of the government’s 
purpose.7 As a result, it required asking about the use of aid, and specifically 
whether the aid could be “diverted” to religious activities.8 But because almost 
any form of aid can be applied toward something religious, the outcomes in 
the cases depended almost entirely on what different coalitions of Justices 
were willing to imagine in terms of use. Over time, that situation produced 
some strikingly unpersuasive distinctions. Paying for textbooks was 
permissible, but paying for maps was not.9 Subsidizing rides to religious 
schools was acceptable, but rides from those schools to museums was not.10 
Paying for special education teachers in religious schools to diagnose learning 
difficulties was allowed, but paying for them to treat those difficulties was 
not.11 In the aggregate, the results made the no-aid theory look like a guessing 
game, not a sound legal rule. 
 
5 See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-06 (1963) (holding that disqualifying a citizen from 
benefits solely because of religion imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion); Thomas v. Rev. 
Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 720 (1981) (concluding that an employee who terminated his employment because 
of religious objections to building weapons could not be denied benefits). 
6 A few Justices noted the issue, but there was no working majority to resolve it. See Sherbert, 
374 U.S. at 414-16 (Stewart, J., concurring in the judgment) (agreeing with the Court’s holding 
forbidding the denial of unemployment compensation based on religious practice, but noting that 
the Court’s no aid-jurisprudence “must inevitably lead to a diametrically opposed result”); Thomas, 
450 U.S. at 724-26 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (making a similar point). 
7 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613 (invalidating a funding program under the Establishment Clause 
even though there was “no basis for a conclusion that the legislative intent was to advance religion”). 
8 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 840-41 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (noting that under the no-aid paradigm, the Court had “long been concerned that secular 
government aid not be diverted to the advancement of religion”). 
9 Compare Allen, 392 U.S. at 238 (holding that a program paying for secular textbooks for use 
in religious schools did not violate the Establishment Clause), with Wolman v. Walter 433 U.S. 229, 
249-51 (1977) (holding a program providing maps for use in religious schools unconstitutional under 
the Establishment Clause), overruled by Mitchell, 530 U.S. 793 (2000). 
10 Compare Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947) (upholding a program providing 
subsidies to parents for transporting children to private religious schools), with Wolman, 433 U.S. at 
252-55 (holding that a program providing state funds to transport children from religious schools to 
field trips violated the Establishment Clause); see also Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at 
a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 119-20 (1992) (noting these examples). 
11 Compare Wolman, 433 U.S. at 241-42 (holding that providing funds for diagnostic testing of 
speech and hearing difficulties at religious schools was permissible), with Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 
349, 367-73 (1975) (holding that reimbursing therapeutic services to address those concerns was not), 
overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000); see also IRA C. LUPU & ROBERT W. TUTTLE, 
SECULAR GOVERNMENT, RELIGIOUS PEOPLE 94 (2014) (noting this example and others). 
114 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 169: 111 
There was also a more fundamental problem. The no-aid theory rested on 
the idea that taxpayers should not be required to pay for religious activities they 
oppose. But in point of fact, all aid by its nature is fungible. Providing any form 
of aid to churches or even individual religious citizens predictably subsidizes 
religious activities because it leaves those groups with more money to spend on 
religion.12 And as a result, the no-aid theory implied that even benefits like 
police and fire protection for churches were unconstitutional. To be sure, no 
Justice was willing to go that far. But it was difficult to explain why, at least if 
‘no aid’ meant what it said.13 And that fact, combined with the theory’s harsh 
results, made it seem callous and even hostile toward religious citizens. 
Given these difficulties, it is no surprise that the Court has turned to an 
alternative principle. In Everson, Justice Black had said that notwithstanding 
the no-aid theory, “the state [ought] to be . . . neutral in its relations with 
groups of religious believers and non-believers,” and that government cannot 
exclude citizens “because of their faith, or lack of it, from receiving the 
benefits of public welfare legislation.”14 Justice Black did not elaborate on the 
normative force behind that statement, but it follows easily enough. Money 
and other state benefits are valuable to everyone: they influence people’s 
choices and act as powerful tools to encourage and discourage behavior. 
Where religious entities provide public goods, funding them on equal terms 
with other providers does not encourage religion; it simply compensates these 
groups for a public service. But refusing to fund them solely because of 
religion is a penalty on religious practice. It discourages religion and 
undermines the Constitution’s promise that government will remain neutral 
with respect to citizens’ religious choices. 
During the past two decades, the Court’s cases have gradually moved 
closer to that view. Under current doctrine, government may provide money 
directly to churches and religious schools that deliver secular goods so long 
as it restricts the aid to secular uses.15 The Court has also held that states may 
 
12 See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 641 (Douglas, J., concurring) (observing in the context of school 
funding that “[w]hat the taxpayers give for salaries of those who teach only the humanities or science 
without any trace of proselytizing enables the school to use all of its own funds for religious training”). 
13 In Everson, Justice Black insisted that services like police and fire protection were acceptable 
because they were “indisputably marked off from the religious function,” and thus could be classified 
as “public welfare legislation” rather than aid to religion. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 16-18. But as many 
have noted since, that distinction is hardly satisfying. See, e.g., Douglas Laycock, Churches, 
Playgrounds, Government Dollars—and Schools?, 131 HARV. L. REV. 133, 138 (2017) (“Every law 
providing for any form of neutrally distributed government [aid] can be understood as public welfare 
legislation. And any part of that [aid] that goes to a religious organization can be understood as 
support for religion.”). 
14 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16, 18 (emphasis omitted). 
15 See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 861-64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (describing 
procedural safeguards that help ensure government funds are used for secular purposes and deeming 
these safeguards constitutionally sufficient). 
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include religious schools in voucher programs so long the decision to fund 
them is the result of “true private choice” exercised by “individual recipients” 
like parents.16 And most recently, in Espinoza v. Montana Department of 
Revenue, the Court held that state funding for private religious schools is not 
just permissible, but required in instances where the government chooses to 
fund comparable secular recipients.17 
The Court’s movement away from a broad no-aid theory and toward a 
principle of “neutrality” is now well-entrenched as a matter of precedent. Yet 
the Court has done little to explain how its current approach to funding under 
the Religion Clauses is consistent with Founding-era history. In Everson, both 
the majority and the dissent insisted that the history from Virginia—and 
especially famous statements by Thomas Jefferson and James Madison—
demonstrated that the Establishment Clause stripped government of “all 
power . . . to support, or otherwise to assist any or all religions.”18 And critics 
of the Court’s current jurisprudence continue to argue as much. According to 
Justice Sonia Sotomayor, for instance, the Court’s modern funding 
jurisprudence has “no basis in the history to which the Court has repeatedly 
turned to inform its understanding of the Establishment Clause.”19 
Numerous scholars also agree. According to Professor Noah Feldman, the 
Court has “adopt[ed] a position almost squarely the opposite of the original 
intent of the Establishment Clause,” since the Clause was meant to “guard 
against the possibility that a citizen’s tax dollars would be used to support 
religious teachings with which he might possibly disagree.”20 Likewise, 
 
16 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 649-53 (2002). 
17 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2261 (2020) (“A State need not subsidize private education. But once a State 
decides to do so, it cannot disqualify some private schools solely because they are religious.”). 
18 Everson, 330 U.S. at 11-13; see also id. at 33-47 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (analyzing the 
historical evidence in a similar way). In Everson, the Court relied primarily on two passages. The 
first was Thomas Jefferson’s claim that “to compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the 
propagation of opinions which he disbelieves . . . is sinful and tyrannical.” Thomas Jefferson, A Bill 
for Establishing Religious Freedom (1779), reprinted in 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
545, 545 (Julian P. Boyd, Lyman H. Butterfield & Mina R. Bryan eds., 1950) [hereinafter A Bill for 
Establishing Religious Freedom]. The second was James Madison’s insistence that “the same 
authority which can force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . for the support of any one 
establishment, may force him to conform to any other establishment in all cases whatsoever.” JAMES 
MADISON, TO THE HONORABLE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA: 
A MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE, reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 55, 
57 (Robert S. Alley ed., 1985) [hereinafter MADISON, MEMORIAL]. 
19 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2030-31 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Although less totalizing in their criticisms, other Justices have made 
similar assertions. See, e.g., Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2286 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that there is 
“no meaningful difference between the concerns that Madison and Jefferson raised and the concerns 
inevitably raised by taxpayer support for scholarships to religious schools”). 
20 NOAH FELDMAN, DIVIDED BY GOD 209 (2005). In this passage, Professor Feldman is 
speaking of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of 
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995). But there is little doubt that the statement also captures Feldman’s 
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Richard Fallon argues that the Court’s doctrine has been too lax, since “the 
backdrop of history” proves that the Establishment Clause “protects each of 
us against being taxed . . . to support a religion to which we do not 
subscribe.”21 Caroline Corbin contends the Court’s insistence on neutrality is 
flawed, since “no reasonable person of [the Founding] era would dispute that 
it violated freedom of conscience to be conscripted into financially supporting 
a religion not one’s own.”22 And many others have expressed similar views.23 
In Espinoza, the Court took an tentative step toward answering these 
criticisms, observing in a brief paragraph that Founding-era Americans had 
provided at least some funding for religious schools.24 That development was 
notable—never before had a majority of the Supreme Court offered any 
historical justification for its movement away from the no-aid theory. But it 
was also incomplete. As Justice Stephen Breyer observed in dissent, Espinoza’s 
 
wider view of the Court’s recent Establishment Clause jurisprudence. See FELDMAN, supra, at 218, 
247 (suggesting that the ban on government funding for religion is “the cornerstone . . . of the 
American tradition of the separation of government institutions from the institutional church,” and 
that “[a]ll attempts to use government resources to institutionalize religious practices” ought to be 
banned); see also Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
346, 417 (2002) [hereinafter Feldman, Intellectual Origins] (“[T]he Framers broadly agreed that 
coercively requiring dissenters to contribute funds to religious purposes with which they disagreed 
constituted a violation of conscience.”). 
21 Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 90 (2017). 
22 Caroline Mala Corbin, Opportunistic Originalism and the Establishment Clause, 54 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 617, 653 (2019). 
23 See, e.g., HOWARD GILLMAN & ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE RELIGION CLAUSES: THE 
CASE FOR SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE 64 (2020) (arguing that “it is wrong to tax people to 
support the religion of others” and concluding the Court’s case law would be unrecognizable to 
James Madison); William P. Marshall & Gene R. Nichols, Not a Winn-Win: Misconstruing Standing 
and the Establishment Clause, 2011 SUP. CT. REV. 215, 234 (arguing that “the violation of an 
individual’s conscience caused by supporting a religion to which she does not adhere” was “exactly 
the type of harm that was of concern to the Framers” and criticizing the Court’s jurisprudence on 
this basis); Micah Schwartzman, Conscience, Speech, and Money, 97 U. VA. L. REV. 317, 318 (2011) 
(drawing on Founding-era history to suggest that the Establishment Clause forbids “requiring 
citizens to pay for religious expressions they find objectionable” and arguing this prohibition should 
be extended to other expenditures that violate taxpayer conscience); Nelson Tebbe, Excluding 
Religion, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1263, 1273-74 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s jurisprudence and asserting 
that “the religious freedom of taxpayers who object to supporting institutions with which they 
differ” has “some pedigree in American constitutional history”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and 
Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 195, 209-11 (1992) (arguing that, rightly understood, the 
Establishment Clause “require[s] excluding religious organizations from public programs” because 
the Clause “protects individuals from compulsory financial support of other people’s religion 
through the tax system”). There are, of course, some notable dissents from this view. See, e.g., 
Laycock, supra note 13, at 144-45 (suggesting tentatively that “the Founders were not concerned 
about money that went to churches in pursuit of secular goals”); Carl H. Esbeck, Protestant Dissent 
and the Virginia Disestablishment, 1776–1786, 7 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 51, 89-90 (2009) (questioning 
expansive interpretations of Founding-era evidence that would disqualify religious entities from 
neutral funding programs). 
24 Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258 (2020). 
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discussion of the historical evidence was too limited to demonstrate a clear 
pattern of practice, much less a principled one.25 Nor have individual Justices 
filled the void. The only attempt—a solo concurrence written by Justice 
Clarence Thomas more than two decades ago—confined its discussion almost 
entirely to an exposition of James Madison’s views, and did not purport to 
offer anything like a comprehensive analysis of the issue.26 
The Court’s failure to offer a historical explanation for its doctrine about 
funding for religious organizations is troubling, especially for a jurisprudence 
that claims to be focused on “historical practices and understandings.”27 But 
this Article suggests—contrary to critics and most scholars—that Founding-
era history and the Court’s funding jurisprudence are not actually at odds. 
More specifically, it suggests that the supposed divergence between 
Founding-era history and the Court’s modern funding cases arises almost 
entirely from a misunderstanding of the historical record. 
Since Everson, it has been widely assumed that the Founding generation 
believed that government was forbidden from forcing taxpayers to subsidize 
religious activity. On further inspection, however, that interpretation of the 
evidence is unconvincing. Although broad arguments against paying for 
religion sometimes appeared in debates over church taxes, the evidence 
suggests they did little to move public opinion. Rather, such arguments were 
frequently criticized as calling into question all taxation to support the public 
good, and were easily evaded by making church tax schemes more tolerant.28 
But even more importantly, the idea that taxpayers can never be required to 
pay for someone else’s religious activity does not square with Founding-era 
practice. Both before and after the ratification of the First Amendment, the 
federal government and virtually every state that ended church taxes also 
funded religious activity—specifically, religious schools of all kinds—despite 
the fact that even in the Founding era, Americans took their religious 
disagreements seriously.29 The practice was pervasive, and far more so than 
Espinoza’s brief sentences implied. Those facts provide good reason to think 
the Constitution does not—nor did it ever—contain an expansive categorical 
rule against subsidizing religion. 
 
25 Id. at 2286-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (contending that many of the majority’s historical 
examples were without force and insisting that Founding-era supporters of religious liberty 
perceived an “obvious contradiction between the reasons for prohibiting compelled support [for 
clergy] and the effect of taxpayer funding for religious education”). 
26 Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 852-56 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
27 See Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2087 (2019) (observing that the 
Establishment Clause “must be interpreted ‘by reference to historical practices and understandings’” 
(quoting Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 576 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
28 See infra notes 51–59, 181–182 and accompanying text. 
29 See infra Sections II.A–B (documenting such funding in the states); Section II.C 
(documenting such funding by the federal government and actors under its control). 
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How then should the evidence be understood? Simply stated, the answer 
is as follows. By the end of the eighteenth century, Americans largely agreed 
that government could not rightfully compel people to engage in specific 
forms of religious worship. And quite ingeniously, proponents of religious 
liberty realized that the same argument could be extended to church taxes. 
Far from being just another form of taxation, church taxes were a coerced 
religious observance. They were a compelled sacrifice to God, a tithe—an 
offering of money, taken by force, solely to finance the religious function of 
ministers and churches.30 And because that was so, these writers reasoned, 
laws requiring them were no different from laws forcing citizens to engage in 
other specific modes of worship. To be sure, coercing tithes for other people’s 
churches was even more objectionable, and many people did not hesitate to 
say so. But the controlling point was that church taxes were a coerced religious 
observance—they invaded each citizen’s right to “render to the Creator such 
homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to [H]im.”31 And 
understanding that argument in its original context yields several significant 
insights for both history and modern law. 
First, recognizing that Founding-era objections to church taxes rested in 
significant part on an argument about coerced religious observance explains 
facts about the Founding era that the no-aid reading does not. In the years 
surrounding the ratification of the First Amendment, virtually every state 
that ended church taxes also provided tax money to religious schools—
including schools directly affiliated with a church.32 And the same was true of 
the federal government after the Establishment Clause was ratified.33 Yet as 
far as we know, proponents of religious freedom did not object to that 
practice. Rather, they seem to have actively supported it.34 Those facts are 
difficult to square with the idea that taxpayers can never be required to 
subsidize religious activity. But they are perfectly explainable if one begins 
from the premise that requiring citizens to contribute funds for the exclusive 
purpose of financing worship is a coerced tithe, but support for things like 
education is not, even if some of the money might also be used for religion. 
Admittedly, we cannot be sure why Founding-era supporters of religious 
liberty objected to funding for churches but not for religious schools. But a 
theory focused on coerced observance provides a plausible explanation, and 
one that makes their widespread practice both understandable and principled. 
 
30 See infra Part I. 
31 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56. 
32 See infra Section II.A–B. 
33 See infra Section II.C. 
34 See infra Section I.B. 
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Second, understanding the Founding-era view that church taxes were 
coerced tithes provides a new vantage point for evaluating the Court’s 
contemporary jurisprudence. The modern notion that funding schemes must 
be “neutral” in their treatment of secular and religious beneficiaries is not a 
Founding-era concept. But rightly understood, the Founding-era evidence 
leads to a similar place.  
Members of the Founding generation who opposed church taxes did not 
object to funding religious schools. On the contrary, foreshadowing cases like 
Espinoza, many of them argued that refusing to fund certain schools because 
of their religious activity was a form of discrimination, and their fellow 
citizens agreed.35 On this view, government was not forbidden from providing 
funds to religious entities in pursuit of public goods. Rather, it was forbidden 
from taking religion into account—either by extracting funds solely to finance 
a recipient’s religion, or by denying funds where the sole reason for doing so 
was disapproval of a recipient’s religion. And under modern conditions, that 
principle leads to neutral treatment of religious and secular entities as a 
matter of course. Where the government’s interest in funding rests on 
something other than financing religion for its own sake, it will necessarily 
treat religious and secular entities providing the relevant good evenhandedly.  
At the same time, the historical evidence suggests some important 
correctives to current doctrine. Although the Court has moved away from the 
broadest versions of the no-aid theory, much of its jurisprudence remains 
focused on the use of money by beneficiaries. That focus has led even some of 
the Court’s more recent cases to embrace nonsensical distinctions and 
unconvincing formalisms which have been quite rightly attacked.36 The 
Founding-era evidence points the way out of the muddle. As an original 
matter, church taxes were analogous to coerced tithes because they provided 
money solely to support religious functions. In other words, they were created 
with the aim of financing religion and in fact did so, which is why the 
Founders viewed them as coerced tithes.37 And that realization can provide 
significant guidance for modern doctrine. Where a program provides money 
for a nonreligious purpose like education or social services and is available 
without regard to religion, there is little reason to think it requires anything 
like a coerced tithe on the part of the citizenry. So long as a program does not 
treat the religious aspect of a beneficiary’s conduct as an independent basis 
for funding, it is not an establishment of religion. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I begins the historical 
examination by considering the evidence from Virginia. It suggests that the 
 
35 See infra notes 278–284, 315–330 and accompanying text. 
36 See infra notes 425–431 and accompanying text (describing these problems). 
37 See infra Part III. 
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argument equating church taxes with a coerced religious observance played 
an important role in the debate, and provides an explanation as to why 
proponents of religious liberty opposed church taxes but did not object to 
funding religious schools. This Part also explores the origins of the argument 
that church taxes were a coerced observance and explains how that argument 
limited the scope of objections to funding religion, even among the most 
radical supporters of religious liberty. Part II widens the historical frame to 
consider historical practice, especially evidence regarding funding for 
religious schools in disestablished states and by the federal government in the 
period surrounding the adoption of the Establishment Clause. Part III 
examines in more detail the nature of the claim that church taxes were a 
coerced religious observance, and especially the characteristics of those taxes 
that were of primary concern to advocates of religious freedom. Part IV 
summarizes the evidence and considers how it supports certain aspects of 
modern doctrine while calling others into question. 
I. CHURCH TAXES AS COERCED TITHES 
Since Everson, it has been widely assumed that Founding-era history 
supports the idea that the Establishment Clause forbids forcing citizens to 
fund someone else’s religious activity, especially religious schools. And 
supporters of that theory have long viewed the history from Virginia as 
providing the strongest support for that conclusion. This Part questions that 
view. It first argues that the more important claim in Virginia was that church 
taxes were a coerced religious observance—a tithe—and that this insight 
helps explain why opponents of church taxes did not also oppose the state’s 
repeated funding of religious schools. It continues by examining the origins 
of the argument that church taxes were a coerced religious offering and the 
ways this argument defined the scope of Founding-era complaints about 
paying for religion. 
A. The Debate in Virginia 
Prior to the American Revolution, many colonies imposed compulsory taxes 
to support a single established church. Virginia was among these, and mandated 
that eligible citizens within the commonwealth be taxed to support the Anglican 
Church in their parish.38 In the Commonwealth’s earliest laws, those taxes were 
 
38 I use the term “Anglican” to refer to the Church of England in America before 
independence. I use the term “Protestant Episcopal Church” or “Episcopal Church” to refer to this 
denomination after independence. 
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known as “tithes,” after the biblical mandate in which God commanded the 
Israelites to set aside one-tenth of their property for the temple priests.39 
In establishing and maintaining its tithing system, Virginia’s practices 
resembled those of England. But there were also some important differences. 
Most notably, unlike in England, where tithes ran with the land,40 in Virginia 
they were computed by reference to tobacco and assigned on a per capita basis. 
The law set the salary for the local Anglican minister at 16,000 pounds of 
tobacco per year,41 which was divided by the number of “tithables” within a 
parish—that is, all free males and slaves over the age of sixteen.42 Typically, 
the required payment amounted to thirty to sixty pounds of tobacco per 
tithable each year—a modest sum—that was collected by the churchwardens.43 
Following American independence, however, things began to change. 
In 1776, Virginia enacted a Declaration of Rights, which contained a 
provision declaring that “all men are equally entitled to the free exercise of 
religion, according to the dictates of conscience.”44 That law officially ended 
things like discriminatory licensing requirements for preaching and 
compelled church attendance.45 But it was notably silent on the question of 
church taxes. Defenders of establishment in Virginia quickly realized they 
could never garner public support for continuing taxes that funded only the 
Anglican church.46 So instead, they coalesced around a compromise known as 
the general assessment. Like Virginia’s earlier tithing regime, the assessment 
would have required all citizens to submit to a tax specifically designed to 
support religious worship by paying for clergy salaries and church buildings. 
 
39 See Act IX (1629), reprinted in 1 WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE, 
BEING A COLLECTION OF ALL THE LAWS IN VIRGINIA 144 (1823) (“IT is thought fitt that all those 
that worke in the ground of what qualitie or condition soever, shall pay tithes to the ministers.”); see 
also Numbers 18:21-24 (King James) (“And, behold, I have given the children of Levi all the tenth in 
Israel for an inheritance, for their service which they serve . . . . [T]he tithes of the children of Israel, 
which they offer as an heave offering unto the Lord, I have given to the Levites to inherit . . . .”) 
For an account of the development of Virginia’s tithing system, see JAMES BELL, THE IMPERIAL 
ORIGINS OF THE KING’S CHURCH IN EARLY AMERICA 1607–1783, at 75-76 (2008). 
40 See generally ERIC J. EVANS, THE CONTENTIOUS TITHE 16-37 (1976) (describing the 
history and mechanics of England’s tithing system). 
41 Michael W. McConnell, Establishment and Disestablishment at the Founding, Part I: 
Establishment of Religion, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2105, 2152 (2003). 
42 Arthur Pierce Middleton, The Colonial Virginia Parish, 40 HIST. MAG. PROTESTANT 
EPISCOPAL CHURCH 431, 437-38 (1971). 
43 Id. Failure to pay resulted in punishment by order of the county courts. See William H. Seiler, 
The Anglican Parish Vestry in Colonial Virginia, 22 J.S. HIST. 310, 311 (1956) (explaining this process). 
44 See THOMAS E. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA, 1776–
1787, at 34-35 (1977); see also VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 7 FRANCIS NEWTON THORPE, 
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3812, 3814 (1909). 
45 Baptists and others were punished for preaching without a license prior to the Declaration 
of Rights. See McConnell, supra note 41, at 2164-65. 
46 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 35. 
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But unlike the prior scheme, it would allow citizens to direct their money to 
the church of their choice.47 
Jefferson was one of the first in Virginia to argue against calls for a general 
assessment. And in 1779, his supporters in the legislature introduced 
Jefferson’s now-famous “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom.”48 The 
preamble contained Jefferson’s well-known argument about paying for 
religious activity one does not like: 
[T]o compel a man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of 
opinions which he disbelieves and abhors, is sinful and tyrannical; that even 
the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own religious persuasion, 
is depriving him of the comfortable liberty of giving his contributions to the 
particular pastor whose morals he would make his pattern . . . .49 
Numerous commentators have treated Jefferson’s broad claim about 
paying for disagreeable religious opinions as articulating a widely held view 
that government was categorically forbidden from subsidizing religious 
activity.50 But Jefferson’s argument was hardly so influential. On the contrary, 
it suffered from at least two difficulties that seem to have rendered it largely 
powerless to sway public opinion. 
The first difficulty was that Jefferson’s argument was unresponsive to the 
actual controversy. Unlike Virginia’s prior tithing regime, the whole point of 
a general assessment was that it maintained state support for religion without 
forcing anyone to “furnish contributions” for disagreeable views.51 Instead, it 
allowed people choice over where their taxes would be directed.52 That fact 
was not lost on Jefferson’s contemporaries. According to one writer in the 
Virginia Gazette, Jefferson’s argument about paying for disagreeable opinions 
was “attacking the old establishment of a particular church . . . and in that 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 47. 
49 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545. 
50 See, e.g., Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2286 (2020) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Jefferson’s statement reflected a well-considered Founding-era position 
that “the allocation of state aid” for religious schools and universities was prohibited); Rosenberger 
v. Rectors & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 868-71 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting) (citing 
Jefferson’s statement as proof that “[u]sing public funds for the direct subsidization of preaching the 
word is categorically forbidden under the Establishment Clause, and if the Clause was meant to 
accomplish nothing else, it was meant to bar this use of public money”); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 
U.S. 783, 803 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (interpreting Jefferson’s statement as demonstrating 
that the Establishment Clause is violated when “government requires individuals to support the 
practices of a faith with which they do not agree”); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 12-
15 (1947) (citing Jefferson for a similar proposition). 
51 Accord A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545. 
52 See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 383 (noting the general assessment “had 
been designed to avoid any charges of coercion of dissenters to pay taxes to support religious 
teachings with which they disagreed”). 
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view is raising a ghost to frighten us with.”53 Moreover, although many in 
Virginia expressed concern about the possibility that Jews and Muslims would 
be forced to pay for Christian churches, that problem was easily solved by 
allowing those citizens to direct their money elsewhere.54 And as a result, 
even George Washington admitted he did not see the problem with a general 
assessment, at least if the objection involved paying for disagreeable 
religion.55 Jefferson’s argument was stirring rhetoric. But it was simply not a 
convincing objection to the general assessment. 
The second difficulty with Jefferson’s claim arose from the substance of the 
argument itself. In making his assertion about paying for disagreeable religious 
opinions, Jefferson was focusing on a feature of traditional establishments that 
many found offensive. But taken to its natural conclusion, Jefferson’s argument 
risked collapsing into absurdity. Proponents of the general assessment agreed 
that government could not dictate matters of conscience. But they insisted that 
construing that freedom as Jefferson had done—as a right to avoid paying for 
“opinions which [one] disbelieves and abhors”—called into question any form 
of taxation to support the public interest.56 “[W]hy do you compel men to 
contribute to the salaries of your judges,” asked Jefferson’s critic in the Gazette, 
“and [then] submit, against their wills, to the decisions of the judges?”57 He 
continued: “You must answer that these regulations are for the general good 
and therefore individuals must acquiesce: This answer is to me perfectly 
satisfactory, and . . . doth equally apply to religious regulations, judged by a 
majority to be for the general good.”58 For many in Jefferson’s time—as for 
 
53 “A Social Christian,” To the Publick, VA. GAZETTE, Sept. 18, 1779. During the assessment 
controversy others also agreed, asserting that the assessment imposed “not ‘the smallest coercion’” 
since it allowed citizens choice in how their money was to be directed. See THOMAS J. CURRY, THE 
FIRST FREEDOMS: CHURCH AND STATE IN AMERICA TO THE PASSAGE OF THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 145 (1986) (citation omitted). 
54 For instance, the famous Virginia statesman Richard Henry Lee explained to Madison that 
he “fully agree[d] . . . that true freedom embraces the Mahomitan and the Gentoo as well as the 
Christian religion,” and he hoped the assessment would reflect this more “liberal ground.” See Letter 
from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison (Nov. 26, 1784), reprinted in JAMES MADISON ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 65. 
55 Washington wrote: 
Although, no man’s sentiments are more opposed to any kind of restraint upon religious 
principles than mine are, yet I must confess, that I am not amongst the number of those, 
who are so much alarmed at the thoughts of making people pay towards the support of 
that which they profess, if of the denomination of Christians, or declare themselves 
Jews, Mahometans, or otherwise, and thereby obtain proper relief. 
Letter from George Washington to George Mason (Oct. 3, 1785), reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS OF 
GEORGE WASHINGTON 1782-1785, at 506 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1891). 
56 A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, supra note 18, at 545 (emphasis omitted). 
57 “A Social Christian,” supra note 53. 
58 Id. 
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many today—the idea that people have a right to avoid subsidizing opinions 
they find objectionable was implausible.59 
Jefferson’s proposal to ban church taxes during the summer of 1779 was 
passed over without a vote.60 And in subsequent years, calls for a general 
assessment gained significant popularity in Virginia, thanks in part to Patrick 
Henry, one of the state’s most popular politicians. In 1784, Henry introduced 
a bill “Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion.”61 
Unlike some prior proposals, Henry’s bill did not aim to establish specific 
articles of faith or contain other more controversial measures.62 Instead, it 
simply required that all citizens be taxed to support the Christian minister of 
their choice. Moreover, the act provided that those not wishing to contribute 
to any church simply declare their opposition to doing so and the money 
would be allocated to “seminaries of learning” within the Commonwealth.63 
It even provided a partial exemption for Quakers and Mennonites, since these 
groups did not employ professional clergy.64 
Proponents of religious liberty like James Madison and Thomas Jefferson 
readily perceived the threat that Henry’s bill posed. Indeed, Henry’s 
popularity was so powerful that Jefferson wryly suggested, “What we have to 
do I think is devoutly to pray for his death.”65 But by the time Henry’s bill 
was actually introduced, several developments leveled the playing field. First, 
Henry had been appointed governor, leaving defense of his bill to less able 
orators in the legislature.66 But even more importantly, by the time Henry’s 
bill came to a vote, defenders of religious liberty had begun to rely on a 
different set of arguments than Jefferson had been able to muster in 1779. And 
 
59 See, e.g., William Baude & Eugene Volokh, Compelled Subsidies and the First Amendment, 132 
HARV. L. REV. 171, 180 (2018) (noting that “[r]equiring people to pay money that can be used for speech 
with which they disagree is utterly commonplace” and arguing that if Jefferson was right that 
demanding such payments is sinful, “it’s sin and tyranny that are everywhere in modern government”); 
see also Jud Campbell, Compelled Subsidies and Original Meaning, 17 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 249, 252 
(2019) (“Jefferson’s ideas about religious freedom were not widely held at the Founding and are thus an 
unreliable guide to the First Amendment’s original meaning.”). 
60 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 56. 
61 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784), reprinted in 
BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 188-89 [hereinafter A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers]. 
62 See CURRY, supra note 53, at 139-41 (contrasting Henry’s bill with earlier general 
assessment proposals). 
63 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189. As Carl Esbeck has 
observed, “seminaries” meant “schools of general education.” See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 79 n.121. 
64 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189. The exemption did not 
relieve Quakers and Mennonites from paying the tax, but provided that they were not required to 
use the funds to support a minister. Instead, they could use the money “in a manner which they shall 
think best calculated to promote their particular mode of worship.” See id. 
65 Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 8, 1784), in  JAMES MADISON ON 
RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, supra note 18, at 65, 65 (emphasis and brackets omitted). 
66 BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 100. 
2020] Church Taxes 125 
foremost among them was the claim that the general assessment was 
impermissible because it forced citizens to engage in a state-mandated 
religious observance. 
To understand the point, begin with the opening paragraphs of Madison’s 
Memorial and Remonstrance. Madison began his Remonstrance by insisting that 
“Religion or the duty which we owe to our Creator and the manner of 
discharging it” must be “left to the conviction and conscience of every man.”67 
But how did the assessment violate that principle, since it did not actually 
require anyone to support a church against his will? Madison insisted the 
answer was as follows: 
It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only 
as he believes to be acceptable to him [i.e., to God]. . . . We maintain therefore 
that in matters of Religion, no man[’]s right is abridged by the institution of 
Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.68 
On a first read, the meaning of this passage seems obscure. But as a 
response to the arguments being made by the assessment’s supporters, it 
makes more sense. Supporters of Henry’s bill argued the general assessment 
was acceptable because unlike traditional establishments, it did not exalt a 
single church or “prescrib[e] a mode or form of worship to any.”69 Madison 
responded to this argument by rejecting its premise. Allowing people to 
direct payments to the church of their choice or to education did not require 
them to make a contribution to someone else’s minister. But the problem ran 
deeper than that: church taxes were objectionable no matter how tolerant the 
scheme because they deprived citizens of the right to worship only as they 
wished—to “render to the Creator such homage and such only” as conscience 
directed. The assessment was an affront to freedom because it amounted to a 
coerced religious observance—a compelled act of “homage” to God, a tithe. 
The idea that the assessment mandated a coerced tithe also illuminates 
other passages in the Remonstrance. Most importantly, it clarifies Madison’s 
famous statement about three pence, the other piece of historical evidence 
often cited in support of a categorical no-aid theory. Claiming that the 
assessment was indistinguishable from other forms of establishment, 
Madison argued: “the same authority which can force a citizen to contribute 
three pence . . . for the support of any one establishment, may force him to 
 
67 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
68 Id. 
69 CURRY, supra note 53, at 138 (quoting a petition from inhabitants of Caroline County); see 
also Letter from Richard Henry Lee to James Madison, supra note 54, at 65 (contending the general 
assessment was permissible because the Declaration of Rights prohibited only “forcing modes of 
faith and forms of worship, [not] compelling contribution for the support of religion in general”). 
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conform to any other establishment.”70 Many modern readers have 
interpreted Madison as arguing that citizens cannot be forced to pay even one 
penny that subsidizes someone else’s religious practice.71 But context makes 
that interpretation difficult to sustain: remember, the assessment did not 
actually require anyone to contribute to a repressive state church. Moreover, 
just a few years later, Madison advocated exempting Quakers from militia 
service without paying for a substitute—a policy that almost surely would 
have required taxpayers to pay more than ‘three pence’ to accommodate the 
Quaker religion.72 Reading Madison’s statement as an unqualified objection 
to subsidizing religion just does not fit the facts. 
But consider another possibility. In the preceding paragraphs of his 
Remonstrance, Madison had argued that the assessment was unacceptable 
because it amounted to a coerced religious observance, a compelled act of 
“homage” to God. And in making his claim about three pence—that whoever 
can “force a citizen to contribute three pence . . . may force him to conform to 
any other establishment whatsoever”—Madison was simply extending that 
argument about coerced observance to its natural conclusion. By allowing the 
government to mandate a tithe, even one as trivial as requiring only three 
pence, the assessment implied that government could mandate any act of 
religious worship whatever. That claim makes much more sense given the actual 
features of Henry’s bill. It also mirrors arguments by others in this period. 
For instance, roughly ten years before Madison’s Remonstrance, famed 
Baptist minister Isaac Backus argued that compulsory tithes exceeded the 
government’s authority since “such communications are called sacrifices to God 
more than once in the New Testament,” and coercing them implied that “civil 
rulers [may] appoint and enforce . . . any other sacrifice as well as this.”73 What 
is more, like Madison, Backus explicitly invoked the image of three pence to 
remind his readers of another “little tax” that stood for so much more: 
 
70 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 57 
71 See, e.g., Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 638 (2007) (Souter, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that Madison’s statement indicates that conscience is violated by “the 
expenditure of an identifiable three pence . . . for the support of a religious cause”); Int’l Ass’n of 
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 790-91 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (citing Madison’s statement 
about three pence to conclude that “the First Amendment . . . deprives the Government of all power 
to make any person pay out one single penny against his will to be used in any way to advocate 
doctrines or views he is against”); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40-41 (1947) (Rutledge, J., 
dissenting) (citing Madison’s statement to support the view that the First Amendment “forbids any 
appropriation, large or small, from public funds to aid or support any and all religious exercises”). 
72 See Mark Storslee, Religious Accommodation, the Establishment Clause, and Third-Party Harm, 
86 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 911-13 (2019) (describing Madison’s position and the debate over the 
Uniform Militia Act in Congress). 
73 Isaac Backus, Address to the Honorable Congress of the Massachusetts Province (Nov. 22, 
1774), reprinted in ALVAH HOVEY, A MEMOIR OF THE LIFE AND TIMES OF THE REV. ISAAC 
BACKUS, A.M., at 215, 217 (1859). 
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That which has made the greatest noise, is a tax of three pence a pound upon 
tea . . . . All America are alarmed at the [British] tea tax; though, if they 
please, they can avoid it by not buying the tea; but we have no such 
liberty. . . . [W]e are determined not to pay [the church tax] . . . because we 
dare not render that homage to any earthly power, which I and many of my 
brethren are fully convinced belongs only to God.74 
The similarities between Backus’s argument and Madison’s are hard to 
ignore. Both invoked the language of “homage” to support an a fortiori 
argument against church taxes—if government could mandate this act of 
worship, so could it mandate any other. Moreover, both referenced three pence, 
not to argue that ‘one penny aiding religion is too much,’ but rather to argue 
that allowing government to require even a trivial religious observance was a 
precedent for tyranny, just like the tax that led to the Boston Tea Party had 
been.75 And that same argument was made repeatedly by others throughout this 
period.76 In all likelihood, Madison’s claim about three pence was not a 
categorical objection to subsidizing someone else’s religion. Rather, his claim 
was that the assessment mandated a coerced religious observance, which could 
be used to justify any other coerced observance the government might demand. 
The argument was about compelled worship, not compelled subsidy. 
The same theory about coerced observance also animates Madison’s 
argument about the assessment’s impact on non-Christians—the one place if 
any where one would expect to find a categorical objection to paying for 
disagreeable religious activity. In its final form, Patrick Henry’s bill would 
have allowed objectors to direct their money to schools within their county 
rather than a Christian church, though anyone choosing to do so would have 
their name “fixed up in the Court-house, there to remain for the inspection 
of all concerned.”77 Madison disapproved, but he did not focus his complaint 
on the idea that the law forced people to subsidize someone else’s religious 
practice, even though many schools in Virginia were probably religious.78 
Instead, he asserted that the bill presumed an improper power on the part of 
 
74 Id. at 220-21. 
75 The Tea Act imposed a tax of three pence per pound on tea imported to the American 
colonies. Colonists perceived the tax as an attempt to impose “parliamentary despotism” by 
symbolizing Britain’s claimed power to tax American goods without allowing the colonists to be 
represented in Parliament. In protest, revolutionaries disguised as Native Americans dumped tea 
into the Boston Harbor on December 16, 1773. See BENJAMIN L. CARP, DEFIANCE OF THE 
PATRIOTS 79 (2010) (describing the politics that led to the Boston Tea Party). 
76 See, e.g., infra notes 221–223, 263–264, 349–351 and accompanying text. 
77 A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers, supra note 61, at 189. 
78 See Esbeck, supra note 23, at 79 (noting that, when the general assessment was being debated, 
many schools in Virginia were “affiliated with a church,” though the bill did not specify whether its 
opt-out would lead to the creation of additional schools). 
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government to command a religious observance, and placed an additional 
burden on dissenters as a result. As Madison put it, 
[T]he Bill violates that equality which ought to be the basis of every law . . . . 
Whilst we assert for ourselves the freedom to embrace, to profess and to 
observe the Religion which we believe to be of divine origin, we cannot deny 
[others] an equal freedom . . . . If this freedom be abused, it is an offence 
against God, not against man: To God, therefore, not to man, must an 
account of it be rendered.79 
Madison insisted that the assessment denied citizens the right “to 
embrace, to profess and to observe” religion only according to their own 
conscience—again, presumably because it demanded a coerced act of worship. 
He then asserted that, even if nonbelievers or others “abused” that freedom 
by refusing to tithe, the state simply had no business monitoring that choice 
or making it a matter of public record: “[t]o God . . . not to man, must an 
account of it be rendered.” Admittedly, Madison’s argument was not as clear 
as it might have been. But seemingly, his claim was the assessment violated 
“that equality which ought to be the basis of every law” because it required 
dissenters to publicly disclose their opposition to tithing in order to benefit 
from the opt-out for schools, with local persecution being the likely result.80 
Madison was not alone in arguing that church tax schemes were 
objectionable because they amounted to a coerced religious observance. On 
the contrary, this claim was also a leading argument among his allies. For 
instance, one of the most popular petitions opposing the assessment 
employed language similar to Madison’s, asserting that “[w]e never resigned 
to the control of government our right of . . . discharging our duty to our 
Creator.”81 Another petition, signed by four hundred Quakers, decried the 
assessment as “an Infringement of Religious and Civil Liberty Established by 
the Bill of Rights,” clearly referring to the Commonwealth’s new protection 
for the “free exercise of religion.”82 Likewise, another writer argued that 
 
79 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 57. 
80 For a similar interpretation of this part of Madison’s Remonstrance, see Douglas Laycock, 
“Noncoercive” Support for Religion: Another False Claim about the Establishment Clause, 26 VAL. U. L. 
REV. 37 (1991). Laycock contends that the bill’s allowance to support schools would have required 
“[c]itizens desiring to support an unpopular religion . . . or no religion at all . . . to declare their 
unusual preference on the public record.” Id. at 46. 
81 Memorial of Convention at Bethel (Aug. 1785), reprinted in CHARLES F. JAMES, 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA 236, 237 
(1900); see also JOHN A. RAGOSTA, WELLSPRING OF LIBERTY 129-31 (2010) (noting the Bethel 
petition received “far more signatures” than Madison’s Remonstrance); CURRY, supra note 53, at 145 
(noting that the Bethel petition was “one of the most popular of the whole campaign”). 
82 See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 148 (quoting the petition); see also VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, 
reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 44, at 3814. Madison also made this argument in the Remonstrance. 
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providing adequate support for one’s minister was a “duty, established by an 
authority much higher than that of any Legislature on earth,” and as such 
“entirely of a religious, or spiritual nature.”83 
Here it is important to be clear. In opposing the general assessment, 
Madison and his allies relied heavily on the idea that the assessment was a 
coerced religious observance. It was the lead argument in the Remonstrance 
and many other petitions.84 But that is not to say this was their only 
argument.85 Nor is it to say that supporters of religious freedom were 
unconcerned with taxes supporting someone else’s religion. Beginning as 
early as 1776, Presbyterians in Virginia had argued it was unjust to compel 
people to “pay large taxes to support an Establishment, from which their 
consciences and principles oblige them to dissent,” and others certainly 
agreed.86 Complaints about paying for someone else’s religion clearly had 
force. But the claim about coerced religious observance seems to have defined 
the scope of that objection in an important way. More specifically, it offers a 
plausible explanation as to why Madison and others who opposed church 
taxes did not oppose another practice that followed almost immediately 
after—the state’s repeated funding of religious schools. 
Following the debate over the general assessment, the legislature hastily 
reconsidered and passed Jefferson’s “Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom” 
that it had originally rejected in 1779.87 The bill included not only Jefferson’s 
early statement about paying for disagreeable opinions, but also a crisp 
prohibition: “[N]o man shall be compelled to frequent or support any 
religious worship, place, or ministry whatsoever . . . .”88 Many modern 
readers have interpreted that law as categorically proscribing the use of 
 
See MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 59 (arguing the assessment infringed on “the equal 
right of every citizen to the free exercise of his Religion according to the dictates of conscience”). 
83 “Virgilarius,” Messiurs Richards and Company, VA. J. & ALEXANDRIA ADVERTISER, Mar. 31, 1785. 
84 See JACK N. RAKOVE, BEYOND BELIEF, BEYOND CONSCIENCE 81 (2020) (observing that the 
opening paragraph of Madison’s Remonstrance introducing this argument was “arguably its most important” 
section); see also, e.g., supra notes 81–83 (noting the prevalence of this argument in other petitions). 
85 See, e.g., Esbeck, supra note 23, at 83-85 (providing a paragraph-by-paragraph description of 
several other important arguments in the Remonstrance). 
86 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover, Virginia (Oct. 24, 1776), reprinted in THE SACRED 
RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE, at 269, 269 (Daniel L. Dreisbach & Mark David Hall eds., 2009). 
Likewise, during the assessment controversy itself, several petitions reiterated that objection 
notwithstanding the bill’s tolerant design. See CURRY, supra note 53, at 145 (noting one petition’s 
observation that “to compel Jews by law to support the Christian religion . . . is an arbitrary & 
impolitic usurpation which Christians ought to be ashamed of”). 
87 CURRY, supra note 53, at 146. 
88 See An Act for Establishing Religious Freedom, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at 
84-86. Proposals were made to amend the preamble to Jefferson’s bill by pro-establishment forces, 
leading advocates of religious freedom to cut off the debate. See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, 157-58. 
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government funds “for the direct support of religious activity.”89 But the 
evidence does not support that conclusion. 
Throughout the revolutionary period and after, citizens who wished to 
acquire land in Virginia did so by obtaining a land patent based on surveys 
conducted by a designated local surveyor.90 The process entailed mandatory 
fees, enforced by the sheriff, which were paid to the surveyor in exchange for 
his services.91 Prior to the revolution, the Virginia legislature had declared 
that one-sixth of those fees were to be directed exclusively to the College of 
William and Mary, which was under Anglican control.92 But after the 
assessment battle and the passage of Jefferson’s bill, other religious schools in 
Virginia began to make requests to receive those funds. And very often, those 
requests were granted. 
In 1787, for instance, the Virginia legislature ordered one-sixth of the 
surveyor fees collected in the district of Kentucky to be redirected to 
Transylvania Seminary, a Presbyterian school.93 Like other schools chartered 
during this period, the seminary was created with the purpose of providing 
basic education to young people in the area.94 But there is no doubt that 
“[p]rayers and singing of hymns and psalms” were “an essential part of [every] 
student’s daily routine.”95 What is more, the legislature was almost surely 
aware of it.96 
 
89 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 873 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting); see also Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2033-34 
(2017) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (reading Jefferson’s bill as forbidding “the use of public funds to 
support core religious institutions”). 
90 See SARAH H. HUGHES, SURVEYORS AND STATESMEN: LAND MEASURING IN 
COLONIAL VIRGINIA 188 (1979) (providing a comprehensive account of Virginia’s surveyor system). 
91 See Act of Nov. 1738, ch. X, reprinted in 5 HENING, supra note 39, at 38, 50-54 (setting fees 
for county surveyors and providing that “the sheriff of any county . . . [may] make distress upon the 
slaves, goods and chattels . . . for surveiors, or other officers fees, refused or delayed to be paid”). 
92 See HERBERT BAXTER ADAMS, THE COLLEGE OF WILLIAM AND MARY 15 (1887). 
93 See Act of Dec. 13, 1787, ch. XCVI, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at 642. 
94 See Act of May 1780, ch. XXI, reprinted in 10 HENING, supra note 39, at 287-88 (describing 
Transylvania Seminary as “a publick school,” which accorded with the legislature’s desire to “promote 
and encourage every design which may tend to the improvement of the mind and the diffusion of 
useful knowledge”). 
95 JOHN D. WRIGHT, JR., TRANSYLVANIA: TUTOR TO THE WEST 14 (1980). 
96 In the months before Virginia allocated the fees to the seminary, a heated debate over the 
school’s curriculum had erupted in the Kentucky Gazette. As one historian explains, critics of the 
school had been suggesting—and later wrote—that “religion be entirely removed from the 
curriculum” and that “the separation of church and state be applied to the seminary.” WRIGHT, supra 
note 95, at 15. One of the school’s trustees, a prominent lawyer and Presbyterian minister named 
Caleb Wallace, had actively assisted Jefferson and Madison in opposing Virginia’s Anglican 
establishment. But in September 1787, he published a letter in the Gazette flatly rebuffing the school’s 
critics. He insisted that while the school was ecumenical in its approach, it was also firmly committed 
to teaching basic Christian doctrine because its leaders believed that religion was essential to the 
moral formation of children. Id. at 14. Yet in spite of that clearly stated intention, the legislature 
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The practice of funding religious schools with a portion of local surveyor 
fees was not limited to Transylvania Seminary. Just a few weeks later, the 
legislature awarded an identical privilege to Randolph Academy, another 
Presbyterian school located in the far western frontier.97 The same attitude 
also applied to religious colleges. Presbyterians in Hanover petitioned for a 
portion of local surveyor fees to support the College of Hampden-Sydney, 
but their request was passed over, perhaps because the college had already 
been awarded a land grant and a lottery privilege in prior years.98 Likewise, 
although the College of William and Mary had eliminated its theology faculty 
shortly after the revolution,99 it continued to receive its share of surveyor fees 
in most parts of the Commonwealth until 1819, all the while maintaining a 
connection to the newly-formed Protestant Episcopal Church.100 
How could the practice of using surveyor fees to fund religious schools like 
these be consistent with Jefferson’s bill and its ban on forcing citizens to 
support a religious ministry? One possibility—consistent with the broad no-
aid theory—is that Virginians did not consider the fees to be genuinely 
coercive. After all, acquiring land was a voluntary choice. But that explanation 
is not very convincing. For one thing, traditional church taxes had also taxed 
voluntary conduct—the ownership of slaves in Virginia, and the ownership of 
real property in England.101 Yet opponents of tithes and religious assessments 
did not view that fact as a reason to abandon their objections.102 But even 
setting that point aside, there is also a more obvious problem. No matter its 
effect on those seeking land, the surveyor fee program contained an additional 
 
chose to fund the seminary just a few months later. For more on Wallace’s role in the struggle against 
religious establishment in Virginia, see Debra R. Neill, The Disestablishment of Religion in Virginia: 
Dissenters, Individual Rights, and the Separation of Church and State, 127 VA. MAG. HIST. & 
BIOGRAPHY 2, 8-10 (2019). 
97 Act of Dec. 31, 1787, ch. XCV, reprinted in 12 HENING, supra note 39, at 638-41. 
98 See RICHARD J. GABEL, PUBLIC FUNDS FOR CHURCH AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 232 (1937); 
see also ALFRED J. MORRISON, THE COLLEGE OF HAMPDEN-SIDNEY: CALENDAR OF BOARD 
MINUTES 1776-1876, at 37 (1789) (1912) (documenting the college’s request for surveyor fees). In 
1794, the legislature awarded Hampden-Sydney an additional 1,200 acres of escheated land. See 
SADIE BELL, THE CHURCH, THE STATE, AND EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 222 (1930). 
99 See BUCKLEY, supra note 44, at 62-63. 
100 ADAMS, supra note 92, at 15; see also G. MacLaren Brydon, A List of Clergy of the Protestant 
Episcopal Church Ordained After the American Revolution, 19 WM. & MARY COLL. Q. HIST. MAG. 
397, 398 (1939) (noting that James Madison’s second cousin, also named James Madison, was the 
first Episcopal bishop of Virginia and also the President of William and Mary during this period, 
and documenting “the large number of ministers [he] ordained”). 
101 See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
102 This is not to say, however, that slavery was irrelevant to the politics of disestablishment. 
For an interesting exploration of this point, see Sarah Barringer Gordon, The First Wall of Separation 
Between Church and State: Slavery and Disestablishment in Late-Eighteenth-Century Virginia, 85 J.S. 
HIST. 61 (2019). For more on the relationship between coercion and church taxes, see infra notes 
373–412 and accompanying text. 
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element of coercion: it required the surveyors themselves to surrender a 
portion of earnings allotted to them by law to pay for someone else’s religious 
activity. It is hard to imagine that affront would have gone unnoticed, had 
Jefferson’s bill actually imposed a general ban on subsidizing religion. 
But consider the problem in light of Madison’s Remonstrance. In fighting 
against the general assessment, Madison and others had argued the 
assessment amounted to a coerced religious observance. Yet Madison did not 
deny that the state had a rightful power to tax in service of the majority’s 
preferences.103 So what actually distinguished one kind of law from the other? 
Here, Madison’s answer was that, unlike other kinds of legislative interests, 
“Religion [is] not within the cognizance of the Civil Government.”104 
Legislation supporting things like education, public safety, and the like was 
permissible because it aimed to further goods that governments are created 
to protect: personal security, material prosperity, mutual convenience, and so 
on.105 But laws like the general assessment—like other laws mandating 
specific acts of worship—were not actually keyed toward any of those goods. 
Instead, they provided funds specifically designed to finance religious 
worship, and in that way mandated a coerced tithe on the part of the citizenry. 
Admittedly, Madison and others did not explain that point as clearly as 
they might have. But it closely tracks the explanations they did offer. 
Presbyterians from Hanover objected to “a general assessment for any 
religious purpose,” but did not object to laws designed to secure the 
happiness, security, and property of citizens.106 Baptists in Virginia said 
legislatures had no power “to proceed in matters of religion” and that “no 
human laws ought to be established for this purpose,” but did not object to 
 
103 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (admitting that “no other rule exists, by which 
any question which may divide a Society, can be ultimately determined, but the will of the majority”). 
104 Id. at 58; see also id. at 56 (“We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man[’]s right 
is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance.”). 
105 See Memorial of Convention at Bethel, supra note 81, at 237 (observing that “the end of civil 
government is security to the temporal liberty and property of mankind,” but that “[r]eligion is 
altogether personal, and the right of exercising it unalienable; and it is not . . . resigned to the will 
of the society at large; and much less to the Legislature”). The theory that government is constituted 
to promote temporal rather than spiritual ends is traceable to John Locke. See JOHN LOCKE, A 
LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 12-13 (Mark Goldie ed., 2010) 
(arguing that “[i]t is the Duty of the Civil Magistrate . . . to secure . . . the just Possession of . . . 
things belonging to this Life,” but that “the whole Jurisdiction of the Magistrate reaches only to 
these civil Concernments,” since “no man can so far abandon the care of his own Salvation”); see also 
Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 255-56 (2017) (noting the 
influence of theories of alienable and unalienable rights at the Founding). For more on the use of 
Locke in arguments opposing church taxes, see infra notes 157–176 and accompanying text. 
106 Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (June 3, 1777), reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 86, at 272, 272-73; see also Memorial of Convention at Bethel, supra note 81, 
at 237 (arguing that the general assessment was “a departure from the proper line of legislation,” and 
that making laws concerning religion was “an unwarrantable stretch of prerogative in the Legislature”). 
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other laws involving taxing and spending, even when they benefited religious 
entities.107 Madison and other defenders of religious liberty in Virginia clearly 
drew a distinction between ordinary taxation to support a public good and 
exceptional attempts to finance religion. The argument about coerced tithes 
explains that distinction.108 And as such, it offers a reading of Jefferson’s bill 
that fits much more comfortably with the facts. 
In sending a portion of surveyor fees to schools like Transylvania 
Seminary, there is little doubt that people realized some of those funds would 
be used to pay for religious activity. But judged by the logic of Madison’s 
argument, that kind of incidental effect is not what mattered. Rather, what 
mattered was that the obvious aim of the program—providing educational 
opportunity to a rural part of the state—was well within the state’s authority. 
On this theory, no one argued the surveyor fee program violated Jefferson’s 
bill because there was actually no conflict between them. Because the program 
was not a targeted effort to finance worship, it did not force anyone to 
“support” religion in a way the law actually prohibited.109 And the other 
 
107 See ROBERT B. SEMPLE, A HISTORY OF THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF THE BAPTISTS IN 
VIRGINIA 96 (1804) (documenting a resolution passed by the Baptist General Committee in 
Virginia); see also infra notes 114–120 and accompanying text (documenting Baptist support for 
various expenditures involving religious schools in Virginia). There is evidence of a similar attitude 
among Baptists located elsewhere in the country. See infra notes 202–212, 236–239, 245 and 
accompanying text. 
108 This theory also explains why no one at the Founding viewed religious accommodations as 
analogous to church taxes, even when they involved incidental costs. Exemptions created to relieve 
burdens on religious practice served a public purpose–protecting free exercise–and thus were 
distinguishable from schemes created for the exclusive purpose of financing worship. For example, 
Presbyterians from Hanover reasoned:  
We never resigned to the control of government, our right of determining for ourselves 
. . . and acting agreeably to the convictions of reason and conscience, in discharging our 
duty to our Creator. And therefore, it would be an unwarrantable stretch of prerogative, 
in the Legislature, to make laws concerning it, except for protection. 
See Memorial of the Presbytery of Hanover (Aug. 13, 1785), reprinted in THE SACRED RIGHTS OF 
CONSCIENCE, supra note 86, at 304, 305; see also Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious 
Behavior and the Original Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 
1808-25 (2005) (documenting debates over religious exemptions from militia service, including 
those that would have required the government to pay for a substitute, and noting the lack of 
arguments involving religious establishment). This is not to say, however, that the issue of 
establishment did not arise in relation to religious accommodations. For a discussion of the 
Founding-era evidence on that point, see Storslee, supra note 72, at 902-15. 
109 This is not to say the virtues of religious education were universally accepted. As Justice 
Breyer pointed out in Espinoza, Jefferson founded the University of Virginia in part to counteract 
what he viewed as overweening clerical influence. See Espinoza v. Mont. Dep’t of Revenue, 140 S. 
Ct. 2246, 2286 (2020) (Breyer, J., dissenting). Yet even here, subsequent practice suggests that this 
view did not translate into a strict prohibition on subsidizing religion. In regulations approved by 
the Board of Visitors soon after the school’s founding, Jefferson stated that students who chose to 
attend the University of Virginia while also attending any denominational school would be “entitled 
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evidence that we possess about the effect of Jefferson’s bill also seems to 
support that conclusion. 
With the defeat of the general assessment, religious dissenters in Virginia 
cast off the burden of church taxes. But there was still the question of how to 
deal with wealth the Anglican church had acquired over years of religious 
establishment. And here, by far the most important issue involved the glebes, or 
land set aside in each parish for the support of the Anglican minister.110 These 
landholdings, which often contained the minister’s residence and surrounding 
acreage, were typically farmed or rented out by the minister and were sometimes 
very valuable.111 And although some glebes had been acquired through 
donations, many had been purchased or maintained with church taxes.112 
Immediately following the passage of Jefferson’s bill, Baptists in Virginia 
began lobbying the government to take control of the glebes, sell them, and 
apply the proceeds to “public use.”113 And eventually, the legislature obliged. 
In 1793, it authorized the sale of an Episcopal glebe in Botetourt parish.114 
The act provided that once the proceeds had been applied to parish debts, the 
remaining funds were to be paid to three schools. One of those schools was 
Liberty Hall, a Presbyterian institution providing general secondary 
education that later became Washington and Lee University.115 As with 
Transylvania Seminary, there is no doubt that the curriculum at Liberty Hall 
included school-sponsored religious worship.116 And there is also little doubt 
that the glebe at Botetourt had been purchased through taxes extracted under 
the old establishment.117 Yet the legislature nonetheless provided funds to the 
 
to the same rights and privileges” as any other student—a policy that would have effectively 
supplemented the curriculum at neighboring religious schools using state funds. See Thomas 
Jefferson, Regulations of October 4, 1824, reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1106, 1110 (Saul 
K. Padover ed., 1943). 
110 See McConnell, supra note 41, at 2148 (explaining the glebe system). 
111 See Thomas E. Buckley, Evangelicals Triumphant: The Baptists’ Assault on the Virginia Glebes, 
1786–1801, 45 WM. & MARY Q. 33, 34 (1988). 
112 Id. 
113 Id. at 38; see also SEMPLE, supra note 107, at 73 (documenting a resolution by the Baptist 
General Committee that the “public property which is . . . vested in the Protestant Episcopal 
Church be sold, and the money applied to public use”). 
114 Act of Oct. 1793, ch. 70, reprinted in 1 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF VIRGINIA, 1792–1806, 
at 274-76 (Samuel Shepherd ed., 1835) [hereinafter STATUTES AT LARGE]. 
115 Id. at 275; see also GABEL, supra note 98, at 231 (noting Liberty Hall’s Presbyterian affiliation 
and its later connection to Washington and Lee University). Liberty Hall was not chartered as a 
college until 1812. See HENRY HOWE, HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS OF VIRGINIA 449 (1845) 
(noting Liberty Hall’s eventual incorporation as a college). 
116 See BELL, supra note 98, at 229 (noting that the school’s 1782 charter stated that each day 
should be “opened with prayer . . . after which every student was to apply himself silently to his 
task, and never to go out without permission until dismissed with prayer in the evening”). 
117 Act of Oct. 1793, ch. 70, reprinted in 1 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 114, at 274, 275 (noting 
that the land had been “purchased by the vestry of the . . . parish . . . and by law appropriated as a glebe”). 
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school, “to the use of the same . . . in such proportions as [those facilitating 
the sale] shall think just.”118 
Likewise, when the legislature definitively resolved the glebe issue a few 
years later, it followed the same pattern. In 1802, it passed a law providing 
that local officials could appropriate money from glebe sales “either to the 
poor . . . or to any other objects.”119 But consistent with Madison’s 
Remonstrance and the statements of other supporters of religious liberty, the 
law stated that officials could not “authorize an appropriation to any religious 
purpose.”120 Again, the most straightforward reading of that limitation seems 
to be that providing funds exclusively to support religious worship was 
prohibited, but providing money for education was not, even if the latter 
might also include something religious. 
Since Everson, many have assumed that the history of disestablishment in 
Virginia supports the theory that the Constitution prohibits government 
from allowing the funds of unwilling taxpayers to be used for religion, 
especially religious schools. But on further inspection, the evidence points 
toward a different conclusion. Although proponents of disestablishment in 
Virginia clearly believed that taxing citizens with the sole aim of financing 
religion was prohibited, they did not object to providing taxpayer funds to 
religious schools. We do not know for certain why that was so. But a plausible 
explanation flows from one of their main objections to church taxes. Programs 
like the general assessment specifically allocated the property of citizens 
solely to support religious worship, and as such, could fairly be understood as 
mandating a tithe. But the same thing was not true when public funds were 
provided in pursuit of some other good, even if beneficiaries might use some 
of the funds for religion. 
In considering the meaning of the Establishment Clause, the Supreme 
Court has long privileged the history from Virginia and the views of James 
Madison in particular.121 And that history is surely important.122 But it is also 
only part of the story. The claim that church taxes were a coerced religious 
observance was originally put forward by Quakers and modified by Baptists 
 
118 Id. 
119 See Act of Dec. 1801, ch. 5, reprinted in 2 STATUTES AT LARGE, supra note 114, at 314, 314-16. 
120 Id. at 315-16. 
121 See, e.g., Hosanna Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 184 
(2012) (giving special weight to Madison’s views and noting his role as “the leading architect of the 
religion clauses of the First Amendment” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)); Ariz. 
Christian Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 U.S. 125, 140-42 (2011) (placing special emphasis on Madison’s 
views and the history from Virginia generally). 
122 See Douglas Laycock, “Nonpreferential” Aid to Religion: A False Claim About Original Intent, 
27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 875, 895 (1986) (noting that the debate in Virginia contained the most 
fully developed arguments, involved some of the era’s most prominent statesmen, and appears to 
have been known and discussed by at least some others in the Founding period). 
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in New England before spreading throughout America. That story sheds 
additional light on why government funding of religious schools seems to 
have been of little concern at the Founding, even to those most concerned 
with religious freedom. 
B. The Origins of the Argument 
Arguments against church taxes in America originated with Quakers and 
Baptists. These groups were arguably the most vigorous advocates of religious 
liberty during the Founding period.123 Yet as the evidence below indicates, 
they did not object to funding religious schools either.124 Understanding the 
development of their argument that church taxes were a coerced religious 
observance provides an explanation for that position, and one that is 
consistent with their actual practice. 
The story begins in Massachusetts. In 1692, the Commonwealth passed a 
law requiring the inhabitants of every town (with the exception of Boston) to 
provide for an “able, learned, [and] orthodox minister.”125 That scheme 
differed from church tax schemes that developed in other regions. Unlike 
places like Virginia that provided exclusive colony-wide support for the 
Anglican Church, Massachusetts’s system stressed local autonomy: eligible 
citizens were required to pay church taxes, but majorities in each town 
decided which church was to receive them.126 However, because Puritans were 
the dominant religious group in Massachusetts, the result in nearly all 
townships was an exclusive Puritan establishment.127 But that began to change 
as pockets of dissent in the Commonwealth grew. 
 
123 See Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of 
Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1439 (1990) (“The greatest support for disestablishment and free 
exercise . . . came from evangelical Protestant denominations, especially Baptists and 
Quakers . . . .”); see also Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 
313, 344 (1996) (noting the particular prominence of Baptists and Quakers in Founding-era struggles 
for religious liberty). 
124 See infra notes 193–212 and accompanying text. 
125 1 WILLIAM G. MCLOUGHLIN, NEW ENGLAND DISSENT, 1630–1833, at 124 (1971). Boston 
was exempt to maintain the tradition of voluntary support that had always existed there. See 
LEONARD W. LEVY, THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 17 (2d rev. ed. 1994). 
126 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 117. For a more extended discussion of the mechanics 
of Massachusetts’s church tax system, see John Witte Jr. & Justin Latterell, The Last American 
Establishment: Massachusetts, 1780–1833, in DISESTABLISHMENT AND RELIGIOUS DISSENT: 
CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS IN THE NEW AMERICAN STATES 1776-1833, at 399, 407-08 (Carl H. 
Esbeck & Jonathan J. Den Hartog eds., 2019) [hereinafter CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS]. 
127 I use the term “Puritans” to describe the original Calvinist settlers of the Massachusetts 
Bay Colony, and the word “Congregationalists” to describe the same denomination after 1720. 
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In 1698, Quakers who formed majorities in the Massachusetts townships 
of Dartmouth and Tiverton refused to select a minister or pay the tax.128 The 
Quaker resistance in these townships was by all accounts the earliest large-
scale effort to resist church taxes in America.129 To modern readers, however, 
the obstinacy of these dissenters can seem puzzling. After all, “government 
does all sorts of things with tax dollars that run contrary to the desires and 
beliefs of individual citizens.”130 But the wellspring of Quaker resistance was 
hardly so abstract. 
Quakerism began in England in the 1650s as part of the most radical wing 
of the Protestant Reformation. Like other Protestants, Quakers sought a 
return to the pure Christianity of the New Testament. Unlike others, 
however, they believed that the authority of the Bible was on an equal plane 
with the “inner light”—the presence of Christ in each individual.131 And as a 
result of those more radical views, Quakers began to resist certain legal 
requirements—they refused to comply with the forms of worship required by 
the Church of England, and also refused to swear oaths of allegiance to the 
King.132 Both practices resulted in significant persecution, and Quakers were 
frequently subject to whippings, beatings, or imprisonment during the mid-
seventeenth century.133 But perhaps the most disturbing aspect of the Quaker 
position to the English authorities was their refusal to pay tithes to the 
established church. 
The most common argument among Quakers was that tithes were 
inconsistent with the freedom of the Gospel. More specifically, they argued 
that although God had originally commanded the Jews to make tithes as a 
sacrifice, Christ had abolished such sacrifices and the “ceremonial law” that 
commanded them. As George Fox, the founder of Quakerism, wrote in one 
early tract, 
Now all the tythes by the law of God and his commandment, the children of 
Israel were to pay to the Levites [i.e., the temple priests] . . . . But Christ 
 
128 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 170-81; see also id. at 181 (explaining that several Quakers 
were imprisoned over the matter and that others met the same fate in subsequent years). 
129 There were, however, some earlier isolated protests. See id. at 117-118 (describing instances 
of small-scale opposition to church taxes in 1643 and 1646). 
130 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 421. 
131 See THOMAS G. SANDERS, PROTESTANT CONCEPTS OF CHURCH AND STATE 115-19 (1964). 
132 See HUGH BARBOUR & J. WILLIAM FROST, THE QUAKERS 41-43 (1988) (noting these 
Quaker practices). 
133 See CHARLES FREDERICK HOLDER, THE QUAKERS IN GREAT BRITAIN AND AMERICA 
152-3 (1913) (estimating that by 1662 no fewer than four thousand Quakers had been jailed in England). 
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Jesus . . . has ended all the offerings, by offering up his own body, to wit, the 
offering of tythes, and all other offerings . . . .134 
On this view, tithes were a sacrifice under the old law that Christ had 
revoked. And partially for this reason, Quakers did not employ professional 
clergy. Instead, they insisted that anyone ministering to the community be 
supported by their own labor or by gifts of any amount from the congregation.135 
The Quaker view on tithes had two important implications for their views 
on church and state. First, because Quakers believed Christ had abolished 
tithes, they insisted that they were obliged to disobey laws requiring them. As 
one pamphleteer put it: “[I]t is a sin to pay Tythes now . . . . [I]f a man 
conscientiously refuses to pay them . . . [he] will be found guiltless in the 
sight of the Lord.”136 But there was also a second, more important 
implication. Because tithes were sacrifices that had been discontinued by 
Christ, any attempt on the part of government to require them was an 
attempt to institute a mode of worship that God himself had annulled. For 
instance, one of the earliest Quaker tracts on the subject, Francis Howgill’s 
The Great Case of Tythes and Forced Maintenance, reasoned: “If God 
disannulled his own command . . . for the payment of Tithes, who or what is 
man that he should make a Law, as well to contradict . . . his Command[?]”137 
Another Quaker put it even more forcefully: 
Now for Men to make a Law to compel the Payment of Tithes, when the 
Levitical Law, whereof Tithes were a Part, is abrogated by the Law of God, 
what is it but to act in direct repugnancy to his Law, and to set up the Will 
of Man in Opposition to the Will of God?138 
For Quakers, government possessed no rightful authority to command tithes 
of anyone, because to do so was to command a way of worship directly 
contrary to God’s direction. 
The Quaker position on tithes attracted little support in England. 
Although some radicals like John Milton agreed with Quakers that tithes had 
 
134 GEORGE FOX, The Beginning of Tythes in the Law and Ending of Tythes in the Gospel, in 5 THE 
WORKS OF GEORGE FOX 259 (1831). For the earliest source claiming that tithes were a religious 
observance abrogated by Christ, see JOHN SELDEN, THE HISTORIE OF TITHES 460 (1618). 
135 See J. WILLIAM FROST, THE QUAKER FAMILY IN COLONIAL AMERICA 3 (1973) 
(“Quakerism was a lay religion with no professional religious leaders or paid clergy.”). 
136 THOMAS ELLWOOD, THE FOUNDATION OF TYTHES SHAKEN 350 (2d ed. 1720) 
(emphasis omitted). 
137 FRANCIS HOWGILL, THE GREAT CASE OF TYTHES AND FORCED MAINTENANCE 
ONCE MORE REVIEWED 49 (1665). 
138 RICHARD CLARIDGE, An Answer to a Letter About Tithes (1710), in THE LIFE AND 
POSTHUMOUS WORKS OF RICHARD CLARIDGE 269, 274 (Joseph Besse ed., 1726). 
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been abrogated by the New Testament,139 most Protestants—and especially 
Anglicans—did not. Rather, they concluded that although Christ had ended 
the ceremonies of the Jewish law, compulsory tithes in some form were 
appropriate under the “moral law” that continued even after Christ.140 And 
generally speaking, that was also the view of the Puritans in New England. 
In 1703, influential Puritan minister Increase Mather insisted that ministers 
were due an “Honourable Maintenance,” since they are “set apart for the 
especial Service of God.”141 And “[i]f . . . People are unwilling to do what 
Justice and Reason calls for, the Magistrate is to see them doe their duty in 
this matter.”142 Yet neither the Quaker position nor the Puritan response 
accurately described the other group in early America most concerned with 
church taxes, and the group whose views would prove the most influential. 
Baptists predated the Quakers as America’s original religious radicals. 
Beginning as a loose movement of individuals in the mid-1640s, they 
established their first church in Massachusetts in 1665 and continued to grow 
in numbers as the century progressed.143 Their distinctive belief, of course, 
was a rejection of infant baptism—a point on which they vigorously disagreed 
with the Puritans and suffered whippings, fines, and other punishments as a 
result.144 But from the beginning they also resisted church taxes.145 And in 
developing their arguments, no one was more important than a young 
minister named Isaac Backus. 
The son of a wealthy Connecticut farmer, Backus had undergone a 
dramatic conversion while mowing his fields.146 The experience eventually led 
 
139 See JOHN MILTON, CONSIDERATIONS TOUCHING THE LIKELIEST MEANS TO REMOVE 
HIRELINGS OUT OF THE CHURCH 6 (Aberdeen 1839) (1659) (arguing that “tithes were 
ceremonial,” and that whoever “by that law brings tithes into the gospel, of necessity brings in withal 
a sacrifice, and an altar . . . never thought on in the first christian times [and] by an ancient[] 
corruption, were brought back”). 
140 For example, Richard Hooker wrote: 
Albeit therefore we be now free from the Law of Moses and consequently not thereby 
bound to the payment of Tithes, yet because nature has taught men to honour God with 
their substance, and Scripture has left us an example of that particular proportion which 
for moral considerations has been thought fittest . . . it seems in these days a question 
altogether vain and superfluous whether Tithes be a matter of divine right . . . . 
RICHARD HOOKER, 2 OF THE LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY, bk. V, at 306 (Arthur Stephen 
McGrade ed., 2013). 
141 INCREASE MATHER, A DISCOURSE CONCERNING THE MAINTENANCE DUE TO THOSE 
THAT PREACH THE GOSPEL 9-10 (1706). 
142 Id. at 59. 
143 CURRY, supra note 53 at 25; 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 9. 
144 See 1 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 16-21 (describing various instances of persecution). 
145 During the 1690s, Baptists cooperated with Quakers in their protest at Dartmouth and 
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146 In describing his conversion, Backus reported that “I saw clearly that [my life] had been 
filled up with sin. [Yet] I was enabled by divine light to see the perfect righteousness of Christ and 
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him into the ministry in dissenting churches throughout Massachusetts.147 In 
that role, he encountered the oppressiveness of the church taxes regime 
firsthand and became a leading opponent of the practice.148 And in an 
important early tract responding to Congregationalist minister Joseph Fish—
which Backus defiantly titled A Fish Caught in His Own Net—he offered a 
justification for that position which would become exceedingly popular in 
many other places. 
Backus began his discussion by acknowledging some common arguments 
in favor of church taxes—that support for ministers was commanded by 
Scripture, that laws requiring them were consistent with natural justice, and 
that magistrates were obliged to act as “nursing fathers” to the church.149 
Backus conceded that there was some truth to those arguments. It was true 
that Christians were obliged by both the Old and New Testament to offer 
tithes: “The priests were supported of old out of the offerings of the people; 
even so hath the Lord ordained concerning his ministers now.”150 According 
to Backus, however, supporters of church taxes like Fish had overlooked an 
equally important point: 
[T]he constant language of the divine direction was that every person of all 
ranks should bring his offering which God had prescribed . . . . [Y]et . . . I never 
could see any proof from the Bible of any allowance of the use of coercive 
power to compel any to bring their offering . . . . The manner as well as matter 
of this duty is ordained by [God] and he will not be mocked . . . . The Lord 
says, I love judgment; I hate robbery for burnt-offering.151 
Unlike the Quakers, Backus agreed with most Protestants that providing 
for one’s ministers was commanded by Scripture. It was an “offering” to God, 
a rightful “performance of worship.”152 Yet because supporting one’s minister 
was in fact an act of worship, the “manner as well as the matter of this duty” 
 
. . . my soul was drawn forth to trust in Him for salvation.” See HOVEY, supra note 73, at 39; see also 
William G. McLoughlin, Introduction to ISAAC BACKUS ON CHURCH, STATE, AND CALVINISM: 
PAMPHLETS, 1754-1789, at 1, 2-3 (William G. McLoughlin ed., 1968) [hereinafter BACKUS ON 
CHURCH] (describing Backus’s conversion). 
147 See HOVEY, supra note 73, at 82-93 (recounting Backus’s eventual rejection of infant 
Baptism and his own rebaptism). 
148 At Backus’s first church, several of his congregants had their goods seized and auctioned 
after refusing to pay the tax; another was jailed for more than a year. Backus also reported that he 
himself was arrested for refusing to pay and would have gone to prison, but a sympathetic observer 
intervened and paid the tax on his behalf. See McLoughlin, supra note 146, at 6-12. 
149 ISAAC BACKUS, A FISH CAUGHT IN HIS OWN NET (1768), reprinted in BACKUS ON 
CHURCH, supra note 146, at 171, 237-38 (emphasis omitted). 
150 Id. at 240 (emphasis omitted). 
151 Id. at 238-40; see also Isaiah 61:8 (King James) (“For I the Lord love judgment, I hate robbery for 
burnt offering; and I will direct their work in truth, and I will make an everlasting covenant with them.”). 
152 BACKUS, supra note 149, at 238 (emphasis omitted). 
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were important.153 Such worship must be, as Backus put it later in the tract, 
offered by a “willing heart” rather than extracted by “man’s authority.”154 The 
problem with church taxes was not that they required the populace to make a 
heretical offering as the Quakers had thought. Nor was it that such taxes 
forced citizens to pay for someone else’s ministers, though that surely made 
things worse. The problem was that, by compelling an act of worship—even 
one endorsed by Scripture—church taxes presumed that the magistrate had 
power to command what God himself had said could only be offered freely.155 
And in the following years, Backus and other Baptists linked their theological 
arguments to themes and rhetoric that were gaining wider acceptance 
throughout America. 
One such example occurred in another early tract Backus wrote entitled 
A Letter to a Gentleman in the Massachusetts General Assembly, Concerning Taxes 
to Support Religious Worship. Writing under the pseudonym “A Countryman,” 
Backus began by reciting the now-standard Baptist argument against church 
taxes. Although “particular Offerings . . . were enjoined upon every Man . . . 
for the Support of Worship,” nothing in Scripture endorsed “any Allowance, 
much more Commandment, for the use of any Force to collect it.”156 Having 
made this point, however, Backus turned from the Bible to another venerable 
source—John Locke’s Letter Concerning Toleration. In response to the 
argument that voluntary offerings would destroy religion, Backus quoted 
Locke’s well-known claim that “[t]he Care of Souls cannot belong to the civil 
Magistrate, because . . . true and saving Religion consists” not in “outward 
Force,” but rather in “the inward Persuasion of the Mind.”157 Locke as well as 
the Bible demonstrated that church taxes were prohibited by confirming that 
 
153 Id. at 239 (emphasis omitted). 
154 Id. at 238-39 (citation and emphasis omitted). The phrase “willing heart” is drawn from the 
Bible. See Exodus 35:5 (King James) (“Take ye from among you an offering unto the Lord: whosoever 
is of a willing heart, let him bring it, an offering of the Lord; gold, and silver, and brass . . . .”). 
155 Backus was one of the first Baptists in America to argue that church taxes were objectionable 
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[for clergy] be by Tenths and Fifths, or how they freely please. Only let it be their soul[‘]s choice 
and no inforcing Sword . . . .” See ROGER WILLIAMS, THE HIRELINGS MINISTRY NONE OF 
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156 ISAAC BACKUS, A LETTER TO A GENTLEMAN IN THE MASSACHUSETTS GENERAL 
ASSEMBLY, CONCERNING TAXES TO SUPPORT RELIGIOUS WORSHIP 4 (1771). 
157 Id. at 6. For the original quote, see JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 
(1689), reprinted in LOCKE, supra note 105, at 13. 
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Christ’s kingdom and the worship it demanded “do[] not receive [their] 
support from earthly Power, but from Truth.”158 
The same kind of argument also appears in Backus’s now-famous tract An 
Appeal to the Public for Religious Liberty. Written in Backus’s capacity as “Agent 
for the Baptists in New England,” the tract has been called “the most 
complete and well-rounded exposition of the Baptist principles of church and 
state in the eighteenth century.”159 It began by reciting familiar ideas drawn 
from Locke: “[I]t appears to us that the true difference and exact limits 
between ecclesiastical and civil governments is this, That the church is armed 
with light and truth . . . while the state is armed with the sword . . . .”160 The 
tract went on to claim that Massachusetts’s church tax system improperly 
“blended together” those governments, producing horrific suffering among 
Baptists and others as a result.161 It concluded by bringing both themes 
together in a crescendo of revolutionary proportions: 
Therefore the whole matter very much turns upon this point, viz., Whether our 
civil legislature are in truth our representatives in religious affairs or not? As God 
has always claimed it as his prerogative to appoint who shall be his ministers and 
how they shall be supported, so under the Gospel the people’s communications 
to Christ’s ministers and members are called sacrifices with which God is well 
pleased . . . . And what government on earth ever had, or ever can have, any 
power to make or execute any laws to appoint and enforce sacrifices to God!162 
It is worth noting the similarities between this argument and later attacks 
on church taxes like Madison’s Memorial and Remonstrance. Like the New 
England Baptists, Madison began his Remonstrance by invoking the Lockean 
insight that religion “can be directed only by reason and conviction, not by 
force or violence.”163 And because that was so, he reasoned, attempts by the 
legislature to mandate church taxes “exceed[ed] . . . their authority,” by 
coercing an act of worship that could only be offered freely: “It is the duty of 
every man to render to the Creator such homage and such only as he believes 
 
158 BACKUS, supra note 156, at 5 (emphasis omitted). 
159 McLoughlin, supra note 146, at 41-42. 
160 ISAAC BACKUS, AN APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY, AGAINST THE 
OPPRESSION OF THE PRESENT DAY (1773), in BACKUS ON CHURCH, supra note 146, at 308, 315 
(emphasis omitted). 
161 Id. at 316, 325-30. 
162 Id. at 332. In making this point, Backus cited two biblical passages. See Philippians 4:18 (King 
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163 MADISON, MEMORIAL, supra note 18, at 56 (quoting VA. CONST. of 1776, § 16, reprinted in 7 
THORPE, supra note 44, at 3814). 
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to be acceptable to [H]im.”164 To be sure, Madison chose the genteel language 
of “homage” rather than the gritty biblical term “sacrifice” in keeping with 
his more rationalist sensibilities. But the underlying point was the same. 
Church taxes were unacceptable because they amounted to a coerced religious 
observance that no legislature could rightly command. And that idea arose 
directly from a marriage of Locke’s arguments about the essence of religion 
and the power of the magistrate and Baptist convictions about the voluntary 
nature of tithes and offerings. 
The use of Locke by Baptists and others also underscores another 
important point. In tracing the intellectual history of the Establishment 
Clause, several scholars—most notably Noah Feldman—have emphasized the 
importance of John Locke in the development of arguments against church 
taxes.165 And as a general matter, that emphasis is well-taken. Locke’s ideas 
were exceedingly popular during this period, and played a key role in 
supplementing Baptist arguments against church taxes and pushing those 
arguments into the mainstream.166 But it is misleading to assert without 
qualifier, as Feldman does, that the Founding generation’s reliance on Locke 
yielded a widespread belief that “conscience would be violated if citizens were 
required to pay taxes to support religious institutions with whose beliefs they 
disagreed.”167 For one thing, Baptists and other religious dissenters did not 
actually object to funding other people’s religious schools, nor did they object 
to requiring people to fund theirs.168 But even more basically, the fact is that 
claims about paying for disagreeable religion were not ultimately controlling 
in arguments against church taxes. 
To understand the point, consider just one example from the writings of 
Baptist minister John Leland, an influential figure in both New England and 
Virginia whom Feldman describes as “follow[ing] straightforwardly Lockean 
lines.”169 In a tract entitled The Rights of Conscience Inalienable, Leland pointed 
out that Connecticut’s church tax scheme, which was similar to 
Massachusetts’s in every major respect, was offensive because it failed to 
 
164 Id. (emphasis added). 
165 See Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 348-51 (tracing the origins of the Establishment 
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166 See BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 
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167 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 351. 
168 See supra notes 113–120 and accompanying text (documenting Baptist support for funding 
religious schools in Virginia); see also infra notes 202–212, 236–239, 245, 369–372 and accompanying 
text (documenting Baptist support for government funding of their own schools). 
169 Feldman, Intellectual Origins, supra note 20, at 387. 
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provide exemptions for “heathens, deists, . . . Jews” and others.170 “Is it the 
duty of a Jew to support the religion of Jesus Christ, when he really believes 
that he was an imposter?” asked Leland, adding that “[t]hese things want [of] 
better confirmation.”171 Yet, Leland continued, that was not actually the heart 
of the matter. Even “[i]f we suppose that it is the duty of all . . . to support 
the Protestant Christian religion,” there was a more basic problem: “[H]ow 
comes it to pass, that human legislatures have a right to force [people] so to 
do?”172 Leland elaborated: 
I now call for an instance, where Jesus Christ . . . ever gave orders to, or 
intimated, that the civil powers on earth ought to force people to observe the 
rules and doctrine of the gospel. . . . That it is the duty of men . . . to 
communicate to him that teaches, is beyond controversy; but that it is the 
province of the civil law to force them to do so, is denied.173 
By acknowledging that “it is the duty of all men . . . to communicate to 
him that teaches,” Leland was adopting the usual Baptist line that paying 
ministers with the aim of supporting the Gospel was an act of worship—a 
“sacrifice[] with which the Lord is well pleased.”174 He then asserted, drawing 
on Lockean themes, that commanding such an observance was not within the 
magistrate’s authority: “[T]hat it is the province of civil law to force them to 
do so, is denied.”175 Of course, coercing Jews or other non-Christians to offer 
that kind of sacrifice was even more objectionable—a “piece of Oppression 
that would make even a moral Heathen blush” as Isaac Backus put it.176 But 
the objection about paying for disagreeable religion was nested within the 
claim about coerced tithes. Government had no authority to command 
payments solely to finance religion, either one’s own or someone else’s. But 
that was not because citizens possessed a freestanding right to avoid 
subsidizing religious activity. Rather, it was because church taxes purported 
to authorize what Locke had proven magistrates lacked power to do—namely, 
to require a religious observance by force. And indeed, understanding that 
 
170 JOHN LELAND, THE RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE INALIENABLE, AND THEREFORE, 
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in THE WRITINGS OF THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND, supra note 170, at 484, 494 (“To honor the 
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175 LELAND, supra note 170, at 187. 
176 BACKUS, supra note 156, at 6 (emphasis omitted). 
2020] Church Taxes 145 
point is crucial for understanding two aspects of the history that have often 
been a source of confusion. 
The first involves the relationship between church taxes and conscience. 
In arguing against church taxes, proponents of religious liberty frequently 
contended that commanding such taxes infringed on liberty of conscience.177 
But it is important to realize that for these people, that did not mean 
conscience was violated anytime government subsidized religion—the idea 
animating many invocations of the concept today.178 Rather, church taxes 
infringed on conscience because they coerced a religious duty—an act of 
worship—instead of leaving the matter to each citizen’s private judgment. 
According to Backus, “[T]he free communications of our carnal things to 
Christ’s ministers . . . concerns the exercise of a good conscience . . . as prayer 
and praise do, for they are both called sacrifices.”179 And indeed, that is why 
Madison and others frequently claimed that church taxes were not just 
improper religious establishments, but also inconsistent with free exercise.180 
By requiring tithes on the part of the citizenry, church taxes commanded an 
act of worship contrary to conscience (violating the right of free exercise), 
while also implying that government had power to control conscience and 
coerce such acts (echoing the oppressiveness of prior religious establishments). 
The second point—and perhaps the more important one—concerns the 
scope of Founding-era objections to paying for religion. In defending their 
religious establishments, critics in New England frequently accused Baptists 
and Quakers of advocating anarchy. According to one writer, complaints 
against church taxes applied “with equal force against paying any tax for the 
support of civil government,” and many others agreed.181 That same 
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sentiment was later repeated by famed Massachusetts jurist Theophilus 
Parsons. According to Parsons, the Baptist position “seems to mistake a man’s 
conscience for his money,” and as a result “den[ied] the state a right of levying 
and of appropriating the money of the citizens.”182 
Backus and others met these arguments by restating their position, but 
also by explaining the limited scope of their objection. “Many try to elude 
the force of [our arguments] by saying that the taxes . . . for the support of 
ministers, are of a civil nature,” Backus observed.183 “But it is certain that they 
[i.e., those receiving church taxes] call themselves ministers of Christ; and 
the taxes now referred to are to support them under that name . . . .”184 And 
“such communications are called sacrifices to God more than once in the New 
Testament.”185 Unlike ordinary taxes, in other words, church taxes were not 
designed to further any of the goods governments had been entrusted to 
protect.186 Rather, their singular task was to finance religious worship—to 
support ministers “under that name.” And because that was so, such taxes 
were indistinguishable from a coerced tithe—they were an offering of money, 
taken by force, solely to support a religious function. According to Backus, 
the difference between church taxes and other taxes was “so great a difference 
. . . as there is between sacrifices to God and the ordinances of man.”187 
Backus was not alone in distinguishing church taxes from other kinds of 
taxes by pointing to the ways that only the former were specially designed to 
finance religion. The same argument was made repeatedly by others. 
According to John Leland, the difference between church taxes and other civil 
rates was that only the first “forc[ed] people to part with their money for 
religious purposes.”188 As Leland explained elsewhere, 
[T]he Lord ordained in the New Testament, that those who preach the gospel 
should live of it. God has ordained it, but has not ordained that rulers should 
enforce it. Whenever, therefore, money is given for religious purposes, it is 
 
EXAMINED 56 (1771) (arguing that church taxes were “acts of the civil state—done for its own 
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187 Id. at 339. 
188 LELAND, supra note 170, at 188. 
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given in obedience to the law of God, and not in obedience to the laws of 
men: I mean when it is rightly given.189 
Likewise, notwithstanding their disagreements with Baptists on other 
matters, Quakers took the same position. “Tithes are not imposed in the 
manner of a civil Tax,” wrote Quaker Joseph Phipps, because “[t]he Intent of 
imposing them is, to support religious Ministers in the pursuit of religious 
Duties. Being not required for a civil, but a religious Purpose, the Payment 
of them is to be treated as a Matter of a religious Concern.”190 These writers 
all acknowledged that generally speaking, paying taxes was fully appropriate 
and part of a duty “to render unto Caesar the things that are his.”191 But they 
contended that allowing government “to take [property] away with the sword, 
under a religious mask,” was something totally different.192 And the logic of 
that position helps explain why even Quakers and Baptists—the most radical 
proponents of religious freedom at the Founding besides people like James 
Madison—did not object to government funding for religious schools either. 
Consider just a few incidents that illustrate their position. Quakers were 
long concerned that sending their children to other people’s schools would 
have a corrupting influence. As a result, they eventually began their own 
schools and sought government support for them. In 1786, Quakers in Lynn, 
Massachusetts successfully lobbied the town to refund tax money they had 
paid toward the local school in order to fund their own school instead.193 But 
they did not stop at seeking a tax refund. A decade later, the town provided 
freestanding financial support for a Quaker school, presumably with their 
approval.194 The same was true of a Quaker school in Bolton, which was 
“reimbursed regularly by the town . . . for almost the entire money expended 
for education.”195 Apparently, Quakers in Massachusetts did not object to 
government funding for their schools, even if those funds might be collected 
from others. 
Quakers elsewhere in New England displayed a similar attitude. In 1791, 
the local school committee in Providence, Rhode Island recommended that 
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schools be set up throughout the city and funded out of the town treasury.196 
Recognizing that Quakers had already created a local school, however, the 
committee declared that the Quaker school ought to receive a share of “the 
money raised for schooling” according to “the proportion . . . of scholars in 
their school” compared to the total number of children being educated.197 
Moreover, the report continued, although the Quaker school would be open to 
authorities for “inspection and advice,” no official was to interfere with “the 
address or manners of the Society, in relation to their religious opinions.”198 
The committee’s recommendations in Providence ultimately failed to 
produce action by the city council, despite having received a majority vote at 
the town meeting.199 But Quaker support for the proposal was unequivocal. 
Indeed, it became their official position. In 1801, the Quarterly Meeting of 
Quakers in Rhode Island instructed members to remove their children from 
local schools, set up their own, and seek to “obtain their proportion of school 
Moneys in the Respective Towns, According to their Assessments.”200 And 
the behavior of Quakers in other places around the country indicates a similar 
attitude.201 Although Quakers rigorously opposed church taxes, the evidence 
strongly suggests they had no qualms about seeking money for their schools 
even if others might be taxed to pay for them. 
Evidence related to Baptists in this period points toward a similar 
conclusion. In 1764, Baptists founded Rhode Island College—later Brown 
University—the first Baptist institution of higher learning in America.202 
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During the Revolutionary War, the college housed American militia men and 
was later converted into a hospital for French soldiers fighting alongside the 
Continental Army.203 However, the building was badly damaged rendering it 
more or less unusable for continuing the college’s religious mission.204 In 1786, 
its president James Manning sought assistance from Congress for rents and 
repairs.205 Manning was a prominent Baptist and had personally assisted Isaac 
Backus in petitioning the Continental Congress to condemn Massachusetts’s 
church tax regime.206 Yet having expressed those convictions just a few years 
earlier, neither Manning nor any other Baptist recorded misgivings about 
seeking money from the government for their religious institution. And in 
1800, Congress granted their repeated requests, awarding $2,800 to the college 
to repair the edifice—the main university building where instruction as well 
as the school’s official daily prayers took place.207 
A similar situation occurred elsewhere. In the district of Maine, several 
colleges were supported with land grants and also with a tax on banks.208 The 
year after the tax was passed, Baptists authored a petition to the legislature 
demanding similar benefits for a school of their own. They first requested 
“the same aid that has been afforded to Williamstown and Bowdoin colleges 
as relates to grants of land.”209 But even more strikingly, they also sought 
“their proportion of the tax upon the banks,” in order “to have an institution 
at which their children may be educated.”210 Nor was this attitude limited to 
funding for colleges. As we have already seen, Baptists in Virginia approved 
of funding schemes for religious secondary schools.211 And as the evidence 
below outlines, Baptists in Maryland and elsewhere also sought (and often 
obtained) tax support for their religious primary schools, too.212 
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Neither Quakers nor Baptists in early America objected to government 
funding for religious schools, even where the money might be provided 
through coercive taxation. They did not explain why that support did not 
trigger the same objections that church taxes did. But a ready explanation 
flows from their argument that church taxes were a coerced religious 
observance. Church taxes demanded a religious sacrifice, because they 
commanded an offering for the sole purpose of financing worship. But the 
same was not true of government support for public goods like education, 
even if recipients also used the money for religion. And if even Quakers and 
Baptists—the most radical supporters of religious liberty at the Founding—
did not see funding for religious schools as a problem, it stands to reason that 
others probably did not either. To explore that question in full, however, we 
must examine the practices of the Founding generation more generally. 
II. CHURCH TAXES AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
Between the Revolutionary War and the decade after the adoption of the 
Establishment Clause, eight states besides Virginia either outlawed church 
taxes or rejected proposals to require them. This Part examines the practice 
of those states and the practice of the federal government following the 
ratification of the Establishment Clause and draws a simple conclusion. In 
each state that rejected church taxes, funding for religious schools followed 
shortly thereafter—a practice that was also replicated by the federal 
government following the adoption of the Establishment Clause. We cannot 
know for certain why majorities across the country made those decisions. But 
the pervasive practice of funding religious schools—seemingly without 
controversy—provides an additional reason to believe that objections to 
paying for religion were limited to instances where funding was provided 
solely to support religious worship and thus resembled a coerced tithe. 
A. The Former Anglican Colonies 
Like Virginia, other states throughout the South had Anglican 
establishments prior to the revolution that included some form of compulsory 
church taxes.213 After American independence, each of these states—North 
Carolina, South Carolina, Maryland, and Georgia—ended the practice. In 
each, however, funding for religious schools continued. 
The most extensive debate took place in Maryland. In 1776, the state enacted 
a declaration of rights that forbade taxes to support “any particular ministry,” but 
left open the possibility of “a general and equal tax for the support of the 
 
213 See CURRY, supra note 53, at 148-58 (describing these state establishments). 
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[C]hristian religion.”214 Like Virginia’s general assessment proposal, that scheme 
included elements of choice. It provided each taxpayer the ability to direct 
money to his chosen church, or to benefit the poor within his denomination, or 
to support “the poor in general” within his county.215 Moreover, when the 
legislature introduced a law in 1785 enabling the tax, it also included a complete 
exemption for Jews, Muslims, and any other non-Christians.216 
Early in the controversy, supporters of religious liberty sometimes 
appealed to broad claims about paying for disagreeable religion.217 Yet like 
Jefferson’s argument a decade earlier, that claim faced significant difficulties. 
The Maryland assessment wholly exempted non-Christians from the tax, 
leaving no doubt that the argument about paying for disagreeable religion did 
not apply to them. Moreover, although the bill did apply to Quakers and 
Mennonites—who objected to paying their own ministers on principle—it 
explicitly allowed them to direct their money to the poor.218 As a result, one 
writer reasoned, “No real injury can possibly be occasioned by the law to any 
society . . . . The Ministers, or the Poor of every respective society, or the 
Poor at large, if any will have it so, are to enjoy what is contributed.”219 
Supporters of religious liberty in Maryland responded with a variety of 
arguments.220 Yet here too, many invoked the idea that the assessment 
amounted to a coerced religious observance. For instance, one writer noted that 
the Roman Empire “compelled the Christians to worship their idols, and killed 
those who refused,” then drew an analogy to the general assessment: “[t]o 
compel a person to worship an idol, contrary to the dictates of his conscience, 
or to compel a person to pay money, against which he scruples in his conscience, 
is much like one and the same thing.”221 Another writer calling himself “Simon 
Pure” offered a similar argument, suggesting that the assessment was 
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impermissible since “[t]he great Creator of all things saith, expressly, that he 
delighteth not in robbery for burnt offerings.”222 Still another argued—just as 
Madison would about three pence—that because the assessment gave 
government officials power to “institut[e] . . . public worship,” it followed that 
they could “become sole judges . . . of the particular modes also, which shall be 
hereafter observed.”223 
The Maryland legislature voted down the assessment proposal in 
November of 1785.224 And although it is difficult to tell which arguments were 
decisive, social unrest over taxes suggests that those concerns may have played 
the dominant role.225 Nonetheless, the argument about coerced religious 
observance explains why religious dissenters in Maryland condemned the 
assessment even though it did not require anyone to pay for disagreeable 
religious activity. But even more, it also offers a possible explanation for why 
opponents of church taxes did not object to the state’s continued funding of 
religious schools. 
Three years before the assessment controversy, the Maryland legislature 
had chartered Washington College, a school on the eastern shore.226 The 
college’s charter provided that students and faculty would be drawn from “all 
religious denominations and persuasions,” but it also clearly stated that the 
school was authorized to instruct students in subjects “useful . . . for the 
service of their country in church and state,” including divinity.227 And just a 
few months before the assessment battle, the legislature appropriated £1,250 
“as a donation by the public” to the college, to be renewed annually.228 
Given the vigorous debate over the assessment, one might expect that state 
support for Washington College would have ended soon after the bill was 
defeated. In fact, however, something more like the opposite was true. After 
the assessment bill was voted down in 1785, the legislature left the annual 
appropriation for Washington College untouched for more than a decade.229 
Moreover, when it finally did alter the arrangement, it reallocated £800 of the 
tax revenue to five academies offering general secondary education,230 at least 
 
222 “Simon Pure,” To the Marylander, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Mar. 1, 1785. 
223 “Philo,” To the Sincere Friends of Liberty and Religion, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, Jan. 28, 1785. 
224 See Rainbolt, supra note 216, at 450. 
225 See id. at 457-58 (noting that significant tax increases led to a taxpayers’ revolt the same 
year the general assessment was defeated). 
226 See Act of Apr. 1782, ch. VIII, 1782 Md. Laws. 
227 Id. pmbl., § IV. 
228 Act of Nov. 1784, ch. VII, § II, 1784 Md. Laws. The funds were to be used to pay the salaries 
of the faculty, and drawn from taxes on marriage licenses and liquor, and from local fines. Id. §§ III-V. 
229 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 223 (noting that this funding scheme for Washington College 
remained unchanged until 1798). 
230 Act of Jan. 20, 1799, ch. CVII, §§ 3-4, 1798 Md. Laws. 
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three of which included religious instruction and worship in the curriculum.231 
And this example is hardly unique. St. John’s College, a non-denominational 
school in Annapolis, benefited from a similar annual grant of £1,750 drawn 
from taxes and fines in the western shore.232 That funding continued long after 
the assessment controversy, despite the fact that St. John’s encouraged its 
students to attend religious worship, at least where it was consistent with a 
student’s upbringing or authorized by parental consent.233 
The same was true of religious schools offering basic education in 
Maryland. In 1810, Maryland passed a law explicitly banning church taxes.234 
A few years later, the legislature enacted a tax on banks and designated the 
revenue to fund “a general system of free schools” throughout the state.235 
Again, religious schools benefited without objection. In 1819, the legislature 
explicitly provided that commissioners in Baltimore were to pay portions of 
the school fund to three religious entities.236 The first two—the Male Sunday 
School Societies of Baltimore and the Female Union Society for the 
Promotion of Sabbath Schools—were affiliated with various Protestant 
churches that provided free education to poor children on Sundays, often 
within church buildings.237 The third entity—the Orphaline Charity 
School—was a Roman Catholic organization dedicated to educating female 
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orphans.238 All three provided religious instruction and worship, but received 
funds as a matter of course.239 
Nor was this the only instance of state support. In 1826, the legislature 
passed a similar measure concerning the school fund for Frederick County, 
declaring explicitly that a portion of the funds were to be dispersed to the 
pastor of St. John’s Catholic Church for the use of the church’s female free 
school.240 Likewise, in 1816, the legislature authorized an additional direct tax 
in five counties to support the education of poor children, stating that those 
funds should be used to send children to “the nearest and most convenient 
school,” apparently without regard to its religious persuasion.241 
Why didn’t those who opposed the general assessment in Maryland also 
object to funding religious schools, especially denominational ones? One 
possibility is that they disapproved of paying for education that included 
religious worship but accepted it as a matter of practical necessity. Churches 
were a main source of education in this period, so perhaps supporters of 
religious liberty acquiesced to funding them even while disagreeing in 
principle. But as far as I have been able to discover, the historical record is 
devoid of evidence supporting that theory—either in Maryland or anywhere 
else. Although the funding programs for religious colleges in Maryland did 
face criticism, those criticisms “derived from the resentment of the high fees 
and of the aristocratic tone of the schools, rather than their religious 
ingredients.”242 Moreover, as in Virginia, the religious schools receiving 
funding enjoyed the public support of prominent citizens who had fought to 
defeat the assessment.243 For instance, John Carroll, America’s first Catholic 
bishop and a leading voice for religious freedom in the state, sat on the board 
of both Washington College and St. John’s and publicly praised their 
endeavors.244 The same was true of funding for religious primary schools, 
which enjoyed support from Baptists and others who had previously resisted 
church taxes.245 
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The argument about coerced religious observance offers a more likely 
explanation. In arguing against the general assessment, defenders of religious 
liberty in Maryland asserted that government “ought not to interfere with 
any man’s faith, or practice,” even if that interference involved nothing more 
than requiring citizens to tithe to their own churches.246 The general 
assessment demanded money for the specific purpose of financing religious 
worship, and as such was indistinguishable from a coerced tithe—it was 
“robbery for burnt-offerings,” as Simon Pure had put it.247 But the same was 
not true of funding to support goods like education, even if those being 
funded might also engage in religion. And the evidence from the other 
southern states points toward a similar conclusion. 
In North Carolina, church taxes ended unceremoniously in 1776 with the 
passage of a new state constitution.248 The change was supported by Baptists 
and also by the state’s large Quaker population.249 According to one 
contemporary observer, the inhabitants of North Carolina had “all in general 
imbibed a Quaker like abhorrence of Hirelings” well before the revolution.250 
But again, no one seems to have thought the ban on church taxes forbade 
funding for religious education. In 1784, the legislature transferred ownership 
of a decaying Episcopal church that had been built by taxpayer funds to 
Science Hall, a Presbyterian academy.251 Several years later, it granted a 
surplus of £250 in local tax revenue to Warrenton Academy, a non-
denominational school,252 in what was likely “the first instance in the history 
of the State of local taxation for schools.”253 
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A similar pattern occurred in South Carolina. In 1778 the state enacted a 
new constitution that ended church taxes.254 But in 1811, the state provided 
$300 per year to multiple free schools within each county—that is, schools 
providing cost-free education to poor white children.255 Many of those 
schools were religious.256 Likewise, during this period the legislature 
appropriated funds for several colleges, including Mount Zion Academy and 
the College of Charleston, both of which had denominational ties.257 
The process of ending church taxes in Georgia was more gradual. After 
the Revolution, Georgia ended exclusive financial support for the Anglican 
church.258 But other kinds of support continued. In 1784, the legislature 
passed a resolution for “promoting religion and piety” that provided aid to 
build and repair churches in the state.259 The next year, it passed a general 
assessment much like the one that had been debated in Virginia, though it 
seems never to have been enforced.260 It was not until 1798 that the state’s 
third constitution finally outlawed “tiths, taxes, or any other rate” in support 
of religious worship.261 But as in other states, the passage of the ban on church 
taxes did not end support for religious academies. According to one source, 
at least thirty-six academies—many if not all of them religious—received 
state funds until as late as 1838.262 
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In Georgia as in other states, we cannot know for sure why opponents of 
church taxes did not also object to funding for religious schools. But here 
again, the information we do possess suggests that arguments about coerced 
observance may have played a role. In 1785, Georgia’s Baptist coalition wrote 
a memorial opposing the general assessment. They argued—just as Backus 
had done in Massachusetts—that “civil and religious government ought not 
to be blended together,” since “statesmen derive no authority from God or 
men . . . [to] establish systems of religious opinion or modes of religious 
worship.”263 Moreover, they continued by insisting—just as Madison would 
do in Virginia—that the significance of the worship demanded by the 
assessment made no difference: “[t]he Three Penny Act on tea was a trifle in 
itself, but a badge of slavery, and a precedent [for] more destructive 
measures.”264 It is possible if not likely that proponents of religious liberty in 
Georgia came to the same conclusion that their allies in Virginia, Maryland, 
and other states already reached. While funding solely to support religious 
worship was prohibited, the same was not true of funding for other goods, 
even if religion benefitted indirectly. 
B. The Middle States 
Unlike their counterparts in the south, the middle states—New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania—were never under state-wide Anglican 
control.265 Nonetheless, here too the practices and arguments relating to 
church taxes display a similar pattern. While funding offered exclusively to 
support religious worship was banned, the same could not be said of funding 
for other goods—especially education—despite the fact that recipients also 
used those funds for religion. 
The evidence from New York is the most interesting. Prior to the 
revolution, New York had at least a partial Anglican establishment in four 
counties in metropolitan New York, but no official establishment anywhere 
else.266 In 1777, however, New York’s constitution ended church taxes in those 
counties.267 And although churches continued to receive land grants in some 
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new townships,268 the constitutional amendment ended taxation designed 
exclusively to finance religious worship. But like other states, New York 
continued to provide tax support for religious organizations that performed 
public functions. 
In 1795, the legislature set up a program providing £20,000 annually to 
support schools.269 That fund was eventually supplemented by a direct property 
tax—the first in the state’s history.270 And two years later, the legislature passed 
an act for dispersing those funds in New York City. The list of beneficiaries is 
striking. The law provided that the mayor was to pay an equal share of tax 
dollars “for the education of poor children” to the following entities: 
[T]he vestry of the Episcopal church, the vestry of Christ[’]s church, the 
trustees of the first Presbyterian church, the minister, elders, and deacons of 
the Reformed Dutch church, the trustees of the Methodist Episcopal church, 
the trustees of the Scotch Presbyterian church; . . . the trustees of the African 
School, . . . the trustees of the united German Lutheran, the trustees of the 
German Reformed churches . . . the trustees of the first Baptist church [and] 
. . . the trustees of the United Brethren or Moravian church . . . .271 
In subsequent years the state also expanded the recipients of government 
funds to include other religious institutions. In 1806, the legislature repealed 
the state’s test oath excluding Catholics from office,272 and that same year 
extended a share of the school funds to the Free School of St. Peter’s Church, 
a Catholic charity school.273 Likewise, just a few years later, the legislature 
provided identical tax support to a school for poor children run by the 
Shearith Israel Congregation, the oldest Jewish synagogue in America.274 The 
funds provided by the state even made up for the back payments these groups 
should have received but for their earlier exclusion.275 
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Support for Catholic and Jewish schools in New York brings up an 
important point that has yet to be discussed. In the eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century, the population of the United States was composed almost 
entirely of Protestant Christians.276 As a result, funding for schools was often 
directed only to those groups, because in many places, they were the only 
ones with schools to fund. But as the evidence from New York illustrates, 
when religious minorities created organizations large enough to provide 
public benefits, they were often included in funding programs.277 There is 
little surviving evidence about how these groups thought about funding for 
religion. But the evidence we do possess indicates that religious minorities 
like Catholics and Jews were not opposed to funding schemes that paid for 
religious instruction or religious activity more generally. They were opposed 
to funding schemes that disqualified denominational education in favor of 
more generic education, which was invariably Protestant and as such 
exclusionary. And when they raised these concerns, they insisted—much like 
opponents of church taxes had done—that government was forbidden from 
legislating solely to finance a preferred mode of religious worship. 
In 1812, the New York legislature considered a proposal that would have 
ended funding for all denominational schools in New York City and turned 
the funds over to the New York Free School Society.278 The Society, which 
ran New York’s Lancasterian schools,279 aimed to “inculcate the sublime truths 
of religion and morality contained in the Holy Scriptures” but “without 
 
276 See Gerald V. Bradley, The No Religious Test Clause and the Constitution of Religious Liberty, 37 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 674, 686 (1987) (noting the small numbers of Jews and Catholics and even 
fewer atheists in Founding-era America). 
277 In Maryland, for instance, Catholics made up a significant portion of the population, and 
their schools received funding alongside others. See supra notes 238–241 and accompanying text 
(documenting financial support for Catholic education in Maryland). The same was true in the city 
of Georgetown in the District of Columbia. See infra notes 315–323. By the mid-nineteenth century, 
funding for religious schools had become controversial, in large part because of anti-Catholic 
hostility. But religious minorities continued to receive state support for other public services. In 
1860, New York passed laws providing funds to the Hebrew Orphan Asylum to build an orphanage. 
Ultimately, the government paid for two-thirds of the orphanage’s building costs as well as the land. 
See JACQUELINE BERNARD, THE CHILDREN YOU GAVE US: A HISTORY OF 150 YEARS OF 
SERVICE TO CHILDREN 8-12 (1973) (describing the history of Jewish asylum for orphans). Similarly, 
in the mid- to late- nineteenth century, Catholic orphanages received public subsidies in no fewer 
than eight states. See Marian J. Morton, The Transformation of Catholic Orphanages: Cleveland, 1851-
1996, 88 CATH. HIST. REV. 65, 67 (2002) (noting public subsidies in New York, Illinois, 
Pennsylvania, Maryland, California, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa). 
278 See PRATT, supra note 272, at 164-66 (describing how the Free School Society came to power). 
279 Lancasterian schools were founded by an English Quaker named Joseph Lancaster, and 
were known for their “monitorial” system, in which more advanced students monitored less-
advanced ones under the supervision of a principal. See CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE 
REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780–1860, at 41 (1983). 
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observing the peculiar forms of any religious Society . . . .”280 The trustees of 
Shearith Israel authored a memorial opposing the plan, alongside the city’s 
Roman Catholics and several others.281 According to Shearith Israel, the 
proposal was objectionable because it aimed to “turn to a particular channel, 
a bounty intended for the benefit of [] poor children,” presumably a 
euphemism for the law’s effort to fund only generic Protestant instruction.282 
But even more strikingly, the Congregation contended that the proposal 
violated the “liberal spirit of our constitution, which recognizes no distinction 
in religious worship.”283 For the trustees of Shearith Israel, funding for 
education that included religion was perfectly permissible. What was 
impermissible—and indeed unconstitutional—was directing funds to some 
schools but not others based solely on a recipient’s religious activity. 
Shearith Israel’s memorial highlights an important point. Proponents of 
religious liberty in the Founding period resisted church taxes, in all likelihood 
because such taxes were instituted solely to finance worship and thus seemed 
indistinguishable from a coerced tithe. But refusing to fund schools based on 
their religious activity was a different issue entirely. Unlike church taxes, 
school funds were provided for the purpose of educating poor children, so 
there was nothing problematic about conveying such funds to religious actors. 
On the contrary, it was denying funds for schools based solely on a recipient’s 
religious activity that was forbidden—it violated the “liberal spirit of our 
constitution” by disadvantaging some citizens relative to others based on a 
“distinction in religious worship.” And as of 1813, the legislature in New York 
agreed. A few months after receiving Shearith Israel’s memorial, it passed a 
law directing city officials to collect a tax and distribute the funds to schools 
run by “incorporated religious societies” as well as by the Free School Society, 
“in proportion to the average number of children between the ages of four 
and fifteen years” attending each school.284  
 
280 A. EMERSON PALMER, THE NEW YORK PUBLIC SCHOOL: BEING A HISTORY OF FREE 
EDUCATION IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK 22 (1908) (quoting a publication from the Free School Society). 
281 See The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Sheerith Israel Convened, 
Petition to Legislature from K. K. S. I. on Religion and the Free School (June 10, 1813), reprinted in 
Israel Joel, Abraham Isaacs, and Jonas N. Phillips, Items Relating to Congregation Shearith Israel, New 
York, 27 PUBLN’S AM. JEWISH HIST. SOC’Y 1, 92 (1920). 
282 Id. at 95. 
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284 Act of Mar. 12, 1813, ch. LII, § IV, 1813 N.Y. Laws 53, 54–55. Officials ended funding for 
denominational schools in New York in 1825. See GABEL, supra note 98, at 352-53. As several 
commentators have explained, that change was the direct result of efforts on the part of the Free School 
Society to stamp out competition, especially from Baptist and Catholic churches in the city. See Timothy 
L. Smith, Protestant Schooling and American Nationality: 1800-1850, 53 J. AM. HIST. 679, 685-87 (1967) 
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Funding for religious schools was also common practice in the other 
middle states. With the exception of New York, these colonies were all either 
founded by Quakers or closely connected to the Quaker movement. As a 
result, none of them ever collected church taxes, though Quaker influence later 
in the period varied between states. Yet here too, evidence from these states 
suggests that these citizens did not oppose funding for religious schools. 
We can deal with Delaware and New Jersey fairly quickly. Neither ever 
collected church taxes, though both explicitly banned them in their post-
revolutionary constitutions.285 Yet as in other places, citizens in both states 
seemed perfectly comfortable funding religious schools. In 1796, New Jersey 
made a three-year grant to Princeton University—then known as the 
Presbyterian College of New Jersey—to repair damages suffered during the 
war.286 Moreover, when the state finally began funding basic education 
through taxation in the 1840s, it explicitly included religious schools in the 
allotment, declaring they ought to be supported in “just and ratable 
proportion” to the number of children in their care.287 
Delaware’s first expenditure for education occurred in 1817. A few years 
later, the state supplemented that program with another that provided money 
to Sabbath day schools—that is, church schools offering basic education to 
poor children on Sundays.288 The act provided that the Sabbath schools were 
to receive a per-student sum not to exceed twenty cents per child, which was 
to be “raised as other county rates and levies are by the laws of this State.”289 
Again, apparently no one thought such a law violated the state’s ban on 
forcing citizens to “contribute to the . . . support of any place of worship, or 
. . . ministry.”290 
 
reserved for the Free School Society alone”); PRATT, supra note 272, at 166-67 (noting the Society’s 
“economic motive” since appropriations were tied to student enrollment). 
285 Delaware’s 1701 charter prohibited forcing citizens to “frequent or maintain any religious 
Worship, Place or Ministry.” CHARTER OF PRIVILEGES FOR THE PROVINCE OF PA. (1701), reprinted in 
1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 557, 558. In 1792, Delaware enacted a constitutional provision prohibiting 
citizens from being “compelled to . . . contribute to the erection or support of any place of worship, or to 
the maintenance of any ministry, against his own free will and consent.” DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1, 
reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 568, 568. Likewise, New Jersey’s 1776 constitution protected 
citizens from being “obliged to pay tithes, taxes, or any other rates, for the purpose of building or 
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or ministry.” N.J. CONST. of 1776, § 18, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 44, at 2594, 2497. 
286 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 215-16 (detailing the grant to Princeton). 
287 Act of Apr. 17, 1846, § 12, 1846 N.J. Laws 164, 167-68; see also GABEL, supra note 98, at 373-
74 (discussing education policy in New Jersey). 
288 Act of Feb. 3, 1821, ch. LXV, 6 Del. Laws 85 (1821). 
289 Id. 
290 DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. 1, § 1, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 44, at 568. 
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The same was true in Pennsylvania, the original Quaker colony. Like other 
Quaker colonies, the state had never collected church taxes.291 Moreover, 
Quaker influence there remained notable after the revolution.292 Yet here too, 
funding for religious schools flourished. 
In 1802, Pennsylvania began what was probably the country’s first school 
voucher program, which continued for roughly a decade. Prior to the 
program, education in the state was provided through two primary means: 
“church schools” run by specific denominations, and independent 
“subscription schools.”293 The 1802 law included both, stating that poor 
families could send their children to “any school in their neighborhood” and 
government would reimburse the school at taxpayer expense.294 
The state also provided a seemingly unending list of one-off subsidies to 
religious schools of all kinds. In 1798, Newton Academy—a Presbyterian-run 
school—received $4,000 for a building in exchange for a promise to educate 
poor children.295 The year before, another Presbyterian school called 
Washington Academy got $3,000 under the same arrangement.296 The 
Academy of the Protestant Episcopal Church in Philadelphia—where famed 
dictionary author Noah Webster once taught as a schoolmaster—received 
10,000 acres of land as an endowment for its free school, as did several other 
Lutheran schools in the area.297 And the same was true of the state’s religious 
universities, which received land or money grants ranging from $2,000 to 
$9,000 between the years 1786 and 1815.298 
 
291 See CURRY, supra note 53, at 72-73. 
292 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original 
Understanding of the Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1810 & n.82 (2005) (noting 
that Quakers were a “substantial minority” in Pennsylvania in the years immediately surrounding 
the Revolution and likely represented roughly one quarter of the state’s voters). 
293 JAMES P. WICKERSHAM, A HISTORY OF EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 178 (1886). 
294 See Act of Mar. 1, 1802, ch. MMCCXLVII, § 1, 17 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
81, 81 (1915); see also WICKERSHAM, supra note 293, at 264-66 (describing these laws and variations 
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be “collect[ed] in the same way and manner . . . as poor taxes or road taxes are levied and 
collected . . . .” Id. at 264. 
295 Act of Mar. 16, 1798, ch. MCMLXXXIV, § 1, 16 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 
62, 63 (1911); see also WILLIAM W.H. DAVIS, HISTORY OF BUCKS COUNTY 216 & n.12 (noting the 
academy “with the Presbyterian pastor at its head, was the right arm of the church” in the county). 
296 Act of Mar. 20, 1797, ch. MCMXXX, § 1, 15 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 501, 
502 (1911); see also CHARLES LEWIS MAURER, EARLY LUTHERAN EDUCATION IN PENNSYLVANIA 
63 (1932) (noting a $2,000 grant for a Lutheran school called Reading Academy to construct a 
“commodious and elegant building”). 
297 Act of Mar. 29, 1787, ch. MCCXCVIII, 12 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 333 
(1906); see also WICKERSHAM, supra note 293, at 98 (noting the connection to Webster); Act of Sept. 
23, 1789, ch. MCDXXXIX, 13 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 333 (1908); Act of Feb. 14, 
1789, ch. MCCCXC, 13 STATUTES AT LARGE OF PENNSYLVANIA 182 (1908) (providing land 
endowments to Lutheran free schools). 
298 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 218-19 (documenting these subsidies). 
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At this point, a brief summation of the evidence is in order. From 1776 to 
the decade after the ratification of the Establishment Clause, citizens of every 
state outside of New England either banned church taxes in their 
constitutions or rejected proposals to enact them. Yet in every single one of 
these states, citizens went on to provide funding for religious schools. One 
could try to come up with an explanation for that practice consistent with a 
broad rule against subsidizing religious activity. But the most obvious ones 
are in significant tension with the evidence. Funding for religious schools was 
not a mistake, or explainable by a lack of resolve—it was done even in states 
like Virginia and Pennsylvania where resistance to church taxes was especially 
strong. Nor is it explainable in terms of the type of aid offered. In 
Pennsylvania, New York, and most other states, the funds were provided by 
coercive taxation of one sort or another. 
But another explanation is possible. Judged by their practice, citizens in 
these states believed that providing taxpayer funds with the sole aim of 
supporting an institution’s religious function was prohibited. But the same 
was not true of programs providing funds for things like education, even if 
recipients might also use those funds for religion. On the contrary, at least 
some argued that as to those programs, it was withholding funds solely because 
of a recipient’s religious practice that was prohibited. We cannot know how 
widely these conclusions were linked to the argument about coerced religious 
observance. But the practice is consistent with that view, and with the more 
truncated versions of the argument that appear in places like Maryland, 
Georgia, and New York. Although majorities in different states almost surely 
had different reasons for their decisions, the argument about coerced 
observance offers an explanation as to why even vocal opponents of church 
taxes throughout the country did not object to government funding for 
religious schools. And indeed, the same practice was continued by the federal 
government even after the ratification of the Establishment Clause. 
C. The Federal Government 
The Establishment Clause was ratified on December 15, 1791. By its terms, 
the Clause prohibited Congress from enacting laws “respecting an 
establishment of religion.”299 Yet for decades after its enactment, the federal 
government—like the recently disestablished states—provided government 
funds for religious schools. That practice suggests that, just as citizens in the 
states had behaved with reference to their own constitutions, no one thought 
the federal Constitution prohibited funding for religious schools either. 
 
299 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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The first piece of evidence on this score involves funding for education in 
the District of Columbia. In 1804, Congress ordained a municipal 
government for the city of Washington, D.C. and provided it with authority 
to engage in “the establishment and superintendence of schools.”300 The city 
promptly used that delegated power to pass an ordinance declaring that the 
schools would be funded by taxes on various property, and by licensing fees 
for things like carriages, taverns, and billiard tables.301 Initially, officials 
directed those funds to two government-established academies for poor 
children: one on the eastern side of the city and one on the western side.302 
But eventually, the city used its federal authority to support a Lancasterian 
school. Those schools—which were the same ones the Free School Society 
ran in New York—typically included non-denominational Bible reading and 
other religious elements as part of the curriculum.303 And though we have 
limited information about the Washington, D.C. school, there is good reason 
to believe it ran the same way. Just a few years after the founding of the 
school, the principal wrote a letter to local officials reporting that more than 
half of the school’s ninety-one children had “learned to read in the Old and 
New Testaments,” and roughly one quarter “are now learning to read Dr. 
Watts’s Hymns.”304 
Beginning in 1812, the city of Washington provided funds to support the 
Lancasterian school out of its education tax.305 That particular funding 
scheme, which paid for the principal’s salary and the costs of educating poor 
children, continued for at least six years.306 After that, other funds seem to 
have been provided.307 And that was not all. During this same period, 
 
300 J. Ormond Wilson, Eighty Years of the Public Schools of Washington: 1805 to 1885, RECS. 
COLUMBIA HIST. SOC’Y, WASH., D.C., 1897, at 119, 121. 
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302 See SAMUEL YORKE ATLEE, HISTORY OF THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS OF WASHINGTON 
CITY, D.C. 4 (1876). 
303 See infra notes 279–280 (describing the features of New York’s Lancasterian schools). The 
routine at the New York schools included daily Bible reading, assembling children each Sunday to 
attend worship at their chosen denomination, and even inviting members of local congregations to 
provide voluntary religious education once a week. See JOHN FRANKLIN REIGART, THE 
LANCASTERIAN SYSTEM OF INSTRUCTION IN THE SCHOOLS OF NEW YORK CITY 65-66 (1916). 
304 ATLEE, supra note 302, at 11-12. 
305 Id. at 9 (documenting that city officials had acquired a building for the Lancasterian school 
and hired a principal for a two-year contract at $500 per year). 
306 See id. at 16 (documenting the end of the tax program and the annual $1,500 appropriation 
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307 The Committee’s journal ends with the repeal of the $1,500 appropriation. However, the 
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reorganizing all schools within the city. See ATLEE, supra note 302, at 16; Proctor, supra note 306, at 13. 
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Congress and then-President James Madison gave permission to institute a 
lottery to raise funds for two other proposed Lancasterian schools.308 In 1821 
President James Monroe even authorized the original Lancasterian school to 
take up residence in a building owned by the federal government that had 
been used as a horse stable.309 The event was celebrated with a great public 
parade and speeches by prominent officials.310 Likewise, in 1840, the city 
briefly funded two “Female Charity Schools” run by the Presbyterian 
Church.311 The program was later discontinued out of a concern it might lead 
to “contention and strife,” most likely a euphemism for the fear that Catholic 
schools may also ask for money.312 Yet during all of this, there appears to be 
no record of anyone raising an Establishment Clause objection. 
A similar set of events took place in Georgetown. Although the town had 
been originally chartered by the Maryland legislature, it was also part of the 
District of Columbia and thus under federal authority.313 Yet here too, 
funding for religious schools proceeded as a matter of course. Beginning in 
1815, the city appropriated $1,000 annually for the support of its own 
Lancasterian school.314 But even more interesting is what followed. 
In 1818, Trinity Church—the community’s oldest Catholic 
congregation—began a free school for indigent boys.315 Within a month of 
opening, it was educating more than one hundred poor children.316 But 
supporting the school financially was difficult, and eventually the church 
petitioned the city of Georgetown for assistance. Several council members 
argued that exclusive support for the Lancasterian school was more than 
sufficient to provide for the city’s poor.317 But others contended that the 
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request raised a more fundamental issue. According to one member, a 
Protestant named Henry Addison: 
If any portion of our citizens are excluded from a just participation of any 
investment of the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious faith, 
a case presents itself which demands the exercise of a tolerating spirit. Such is 
now the case before us. The real question is, whether a religious sect which has 
been taxed more than seventeen years to support a free school of whose 
advantages they could not avail themselves, can now be allowed a small sum of 
money to assist in defraying the expenses of their one free school, established 
and supported by more than ten years by their own individual contributions.318 
Addison’s argument bears a strong similarity to the argument offered by 
Shearith Israel during the controversy over school funding in New York. 
Shearith Israel had contended that a proposal to deny funding to 
denominational schools violated “the liberal spirit of our constitution,” 
because it proposed allocating funds to some schools but not others based on 
a “distinction in religious worship.”319 Addison reasoned similarly, contending 
that government ought not “exclude[] [citizens] from . . . any investment of 
the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious faith.”320 
Again, this argument highlights the important difference that citizens in 
this period perceived between church taxes and funding for religious schools. 
Providing funds exclusively to support a religious function was objectionable, 
probably because such schemes were viewed as coerced tithes. But that 
objection did not apply to providing religious entities with funds to support 
goods like education. On the contrary, for people like Addison and others, 
refusing to provide school funds based solely on “a peculiarity of religious 
faith” was actually a penalty on religious exercise—it excluded citizens from 
“just participation” in “investment of the public funds” solely for practicing 
their religion.321 And as that argument had succeeded in New York, so it also 
succeeded in Georgetown. 
In 1832, the city awarded Trinity’s free school $200 annually—a sum which 
probably corresponded to the proportion of children educated there 
compared to the Lancasterian school.322 Again, there seems to be no evidence 
 
318 Id. 
319 The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Shearith Israel Convened, supra note 
281, at 95. 
320 WARNER, supra note 314, at 77. 
321 Id. 
322 Id. As of 1815, the Lancasterian school in Georgetown was educating roughly five hundred 
students, while Trinity’s free school had roughly one hundred. See ATLEE, supra note 302, at 13 
(documenting the number of children enrolled in the Lancasterian school); WARNER, supra note 
314, at 118 (documenting the number of children enrolled in the Trinity free school). For the text of 
 
2020] Church Taxes 167 
of any Establishment Clause objection. On the contrary, the year after 
receiving the allotment, the trustees of the Trinity school successfully 
petitioned Congress to incorporate it, quite possibly so that the school could 
more easily receive the outside funds.323 
An additional piece of evidence involving the federal government provides 
further reason to believe that arguments like Addison’s and Shearith Israel’s 
may have been fairly well-accepted. Beginning in 1727, Catholic nuns in New 
Orleans operated a convent which included a large free school for destitute 
children.324 When the Louisiana Purchase occurred, the nuns sent a letter to 
Jefferson in 1804 inquiring about the future of their property. Because the 
property had previously been controlled by the French government, it could 
very well have been considered to have passed to the United States.325 
Jefferson sent a response to assuage their concerns. He first assured the 
nuns that “the principles of the constitution” ensured that the property would 
be “preserved to you sacred and inviolate,” and that the convent “will be 
permitted to govern itself . . . without interference from the civil authority.”326 
He then said that “whatever diversity of shade may appear in the religious 
opinions of our fellow citizens,” the “charitable objects of your institution . . . 
cannot fail to ensure it the patronage of the government it is under.”327 
Like Addison and Shearith Israel, Jefferson acknowledged that 
denominational schools were presumptively entitled to public support for the 
“charitable objects” they undertook.328 Moreover, responding to the nuns’ 
worries that their particular religious activity might disqualify them, Jefferson 
explicitly invoked the federal Constitution to assert the opposite conclusion. 
The Catholic school was guaranteed “the patronage of the government” for 
its educational activities, “whatever diversity of shade may appear in the 
religious opinions of our fellow citizens.”329 Far from providing a reason for 
special exclusion, Jefferson insisted that denying the school support because 
of its religious activity was not just impolitic, but perhaps even prohibited by 
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the “principles of the constitution.”330 Just as government could not provide 
support solely to finance a recipient’s religion, neither could it deny support 
where the sole reason for doing so was a recipient’s religion. 
Support for religious education on the part of the federal government was 
not limited to these instances. An equally important class of evidence involves 
federal funding for religious education among the Native American tribes. 
Less than a year after the Establishment Clause was ratified, the 
Washington administration authorized payment of $1,500 annually to support 
a Presbyterian school among the Iroquois and Stockbridge Indians.331 A 
similar practice continued during Thomas Jefferson’s presidency. In 1803, the 
federal government provided the Kaskaskia tribe with a payment of $100 to 
be repeated annually for seven years “towards the support of a priest,” who 
was to “instruct as many of their children as possible in the rudiments of 
literature” while also carrying out “the duties of his office.”332 It also provided 
a one-time payment of $300 toward the erection of a church, perhaps to 
facilitate the instruction.333 Had the Establishment Clause been understood 
as forbidding any subsidization of religious activity, it is difficult to see how 
any of this could have proceeded without objection, from Jefferson himself 
no less. Yet that appears to be what happened. 
Programs providing federal money to run religious schools for Native 
Americans continued long past Jefferson’s presidency. Beginning in 1793 and 
continuing thereafter, Congress designated as much as $20,000 to fund 
“temporary agents, to reside among the Indians, as he [the President] shall 
think proper,” many of whom were Christian ministers.334 By 1817, Congress 
was appropriating $10,000 per year to support the work of religious 
organizations in providing basic education.335 Congress continued that 
practice more or less uninterrupted until as late as 1870, when it appropriated 
$100,000 for such purposes.336 Recipients of those funds were private agencies 
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supervised by Methodists, Baptists, Presbyterians, Episcopalians, Quakers, 
Catholics, and other denominations, all of whom ran religious schools.337 
In sum, both the federal government and officials under its authority 
continued to provide money to religious institutions for education even after 
the ratification of the Establishment Clause, just as the states had done after 
prohibiting church taxes in their constitutions. Again, perhaps there is an 
explanation for this practice consistent with a broad no-aid theory. But the 
most plausible explanation seems to be that, like their counterparts in the 
states, federal actors did not think such expenditures were prohibited merely 
because the funds might be used for religion. In fact, on several occasions, they 
asserted that it was the withholding of funds because of a recipient’s religion 
that was forbidden, at least when the funds were provided for a public purpose. 
Still, there is one other issue that merits attention. Traditional church 
taxes had certain features in common that made them objectionable to many 
people at the Founding. But there were also some areas of ongoing 
disagreement. For instance, what if the tax wasn’t explicitly earmarked for 
religious recipients, or the funding didn’t involve coercion of any kind? 
Understanding how members of the Founding generation actually identified 
church tax schemes is essential for relating the Founding-era history to ours, 
and to understanding how the argument comparing church taxes to coerced 
tithes functioned in practice. 
III. IDENTIFYING CHURCH TAXES 
Almost all church tax schemes at the Founding had three elements in 
common: (1) they collected private resources through coercion, (2) earmarked 
those resources for religious actors, and (3) redistributed them for the 
purpose of financing religious functions. In Massachusetts, for instance, 
church taxes were assessed on all eligible citizens and designated at collection 
for the benefit of the local minister to support him in carrying out religious 
duties. Likewise, in Virginia and other Anglican colonies, church taxes had 
long been assessed on a per-capita basis for the explicit benefit of the Anglican 
minister in his parish role. Later iterations like general assessment proposals 
or exemptions for dissenters complicated things slightly. But these elements 
were still the defining features of most church tax schemes during the 
Founding period. 
The argument that church taxes were a coerced religious observance—a tithe 
or sacrifice—fits most comfortably in relation to these schemes. To paraphrase 
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Founding-era advocates of religious liberty, earmarked taxes to support a 
church’s religious function both “force[d] people to part with their money for 
religious purposes” at collection,338 and subsequently financed ministers “in the 
Pursuit of religious duties.”339 But proponents of religious liberty also extended 
these objections to other kinds of funding schemes that were specifically 
designed to finance religious worship. Some of these arguments appear to have 
garnered less support than objections to traditional church taxes. But 
understanding them provides important information about how at least some at 
the Founding viewed other attempts to finance religion—a point of possible 
importance for considering controversies over funding today. 
A. The Role of Earmarks 
The first important consideration concerns earmarks. As has already been 
mentioned, one common feature of Founding-era church tax schemes was 
that they involved taxes earmarked for religious entities at collection, rather 
than generic taxes paid into the general treasury. For example, Patrick 
Henry’s general assessment proposal in Virginia explicitly announced that the 
tax was “for the support of Christian teachers” and could only be distributed 
to churches for uses furthering that purpose.340 Earmarks undoubtedly 
strengthened the argument that church taxes were a coerced sacrifice, since 
they accentuated the “causal link between the extraction . . . and the monetary 
support of religion.”341 But the fact that taxes were sometimes earmarked for 
religious recipients was not in itself sufficient to trigger this objection. And 
there is at least some evidence suggesting that, where the eventual 
expenditure was aimed exclusively at financing religion, an earmark may not 
have been necessary either. 
The first point—that earmarks alone were not dispositive—relates to the 
distinction between church taxes and funding for religious schools. In 
supporting religious schools, many states employed tax money that was 
designated as general revenue or assigned for education generally at the point 
of collection. But sometimes they also created schemes that specifically 
earmarked funds for religious schools. In Virginia, for instance, the legislature 
repeatedly reserved a portion of surveyor fees in certain regions for specific 
schools, including several religious ones.342 Similarly, support for Washington 
College and for other religious schools in Maryland was explicitly tied to the 
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imposition of various taxes and fees in the eastern shore.343 The same was 
true in Delaware and New Jersey, which both had laws explicitly stating that 
a portion of specific taxes would be distributed to religious entities—
including churches—to subsidize their schools.344 As we have already 
observed, none of these schemes provoked protest, even from the most 
extreme supporters of religious liberty. The fact that a tax was earmarked for 
a religious recipient was not sufficient to generate the objection that it was a 
coerced offering, at least where the obvious aim was promoting education. 
Designating a tax for the benefit of a religious entity—without more—did 
not make it a tithe. 
The second point is more complicated. For the Founding generation, 
earmarking a tax to support a religious school was not sufficient to trigger 
objections, presumably because such funding still served a public purpose 
even if it benefited religion indirectly. But what about instances in which 
government attempted to use funds collected through general taxes for an 
exclusively religious end? Here the evidence is less clear, but there is 
indication that at least some at the Founding viewed such schemes as 
comparable to coerced tithes, even though they lacked the earmarks normally 
associated with church taxes. 
The most well-known example is payments for chaplains. Several days 
before the language of the Establishment Clause was agreed on, Congress 
passed a bill authorizing salaries for various officials, including a chaplain for 
each house of Congress.345 The funds used to pay these salaries were to be 
drawn from the federal treasury,346 which at the time was funded primarily 
through taxes on imports.347 Madison voted for the expenditure and later 
approved appropriations for chaplains as President, but several years later he 
objected, in part because the payments for chaplains were given for “religious 
worship . . . performed by Ministers of religion . . . [that were] paid out of 
the national taxes.”348 Baptist minister John Leland reasoned similarly, noting 
that although the salary of federal chaplains was “a trifle, far less than the 
three pence upon a pound of tea,” it was nonetheless objectionable since 
“[t]his money they receive for religious services, by the force of the laws of 
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the national legislature.”349 According to Leland, such support was a “thing 
to be reprobated,”350 and at least roughly comparable to “robbery for burnt 
offerings,”351 despite the fact that it was supplied through general tax revenue. 
The argument against paying chaplains with tax revenue was consistent 
with what Madison called “the pure principle of religious freedom” interpreted 
“[i]n “strictness.”352 Chaplains threatened religious freedom because they 
inevitably reflected the majority’s religious preferences to the exclusion of the 
minority, and because they risked corrupting religion by making it a tool of the 
state.353 But the idea that the government’s sole aim in paying chaplains was to 
finance “religious services” was questionable in many instances. Chaplains in 
the army and the navy were an accommodation to the religious needs of 
soldiers—their purpose was to allow individuals in the government’s care to 
practice their religion, a point which Madison himself more or less admitted.354 
Moreover, although payments for congressional chaplains were more troubling, 
even these writers recognized that their unique context made them a minor 
deviation—a “little horn” as Leland put it—not a major encroachment.355 But 
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the same was not true of other programs that directed general tax revenue solely 
to support religious functions. And here, the most significant evidence comes 
from Connecticut. 
In 1816, Connecticut passed a law entitled “An Act for the Support of 
Literature and Religion.”356 The act began by recognizing that the state was 
set to receive a large amount of money from the federal government, which 
was a refund from taxes collected to support national defense during the War 
of 1812.357 It then declared that the refunded money was to be divided among 
various denominations: Congregationalist churches were to receive one-third, 
Episcopalians one-seventh, Baptists one-eighth, Methodists one-twelfth, 
with an additional one-seventh for Yale College.358 Each denomination was 
to use the funds “for the support of the Gospel in their respective societies.”359 
As a last-ditch effort to support Connecticut’s religious establishment, the 
1816 appropriation was a brilliant ploy. Because the money had been originally 
extracted as a war tax rather than a tax earmarked for ministers, it was 
arguably different in kind from other church taxes. Or so it appeared to the 
law’s supporters. According to the drafting committee, the law’s 
appropriation could be rightly accepted “[e]ven [by] those Christians who do 
not acknowledge the right of the Civil Magistrate to enforce collections for 
these purposes.”360 But proponents of religious liberty did not see it that way. 
“Surely they must have supposed us less virtuous than Judas Iscariot,” noted 
one writer, and others agreed.361 
Baptists and Methodists throughout the state published numerous 
objections to the law, which they saw as an extension of Connecticut’s existing 
church tax system.362 The resistance culminated in a memorial written by the 
state’s Baptists.363 It began by proceeding through the usual arguments. Laws 
requiring people to pay money solely to finance someone else’s ministers were 
offensive and unjust, since they required others to do what supporters of church 
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taxes would never want done to them.364 Moreover, since support for a minister 
in his religious role was “required as a religious duty,” it was an “offering[]”365 
that exceeded government’s rightful authority to compel—“the individual 
himself is the only human judge of what his duty is towards his God.”366  
Most important, however, was the memorial’s treatment of the 1816 law 
itself. According to the Baptists, the appropriation was objectionable even 
though it had been raised through a non-earmarked tax: it still took “[s]ome 
money, that was raised by the civil authority by taxation,” and “because it 
came in that way; and was to be used exclusively ‘for the support of the 
gospel,’ it remain[ed] unaccepted.”367 The 1816 law did not involve a tax 
labeled at collection for the support of ministers. But for these Baptists, that 
made little difference—it was money garnered through coercion and 
appropriated for an exclusively religious purpose. “It is more blessed to give 
than to receive,” they observed, “but there is no blessedness in compulsion, 
either to the sufferer or receiver.”368 
Baptists in Connecticut objected to the 1816 appropriation as a form of 
religious coercion even though it did not originate as an earmarked tax. That 
conclusion resonates with objections to paying chaplains out of general tax 
revenue. And it also has clear affinities with the idea that taxing citizens solely 
to finance religion is in fact equivalent to mandating a religious observance. 
But none of the sources equate these schemes with coerced tithes 
unequivocally, and it is unclear how widely that argument would have been 
shared if they had—after all, no one would have recognized the payment as a 
tithe at the point of collection. Yet if there is ambiguity in the precise nature 
of the objection, there is no ambiguity in how far it extended. Having asserted 
that the 1816 law was unacceptable because it involved tax money 
appropriated “exclusively ‘for the support of the Gospel,’” the Baptists 
clarified their position as follows: 
Had the legislature left it freely to the donees, to appropriate it, as they 
thought best; and if a method of dividing it could be found, that would give 
general satisfaction, perhaps it would have been accepted. It presents a 
singular instance in national concerns [however] that power and property 
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should be bestowed on a people, for religious purposes, which they never 
desired . . . .369 
According to the Connecticut Baptists, the 1816 appropriation was 
objectionable because it provided funds garnered through coercion 
exclusively to support a religious function. But that did not mean that all 
appropriations to churches or religious entities were forbidden. Had the 
legislature instead simply provided funds for a public purpose and left 
religious recipients “to appropriate it, as they thought best,” and had the 
method for dividing it achieved “general satisfaction” by being truly even-
handed among denominations, it would have been acceptable.370 That 
position coheres with the view held by Baptists elsewhere regarding tax 
support for education, even education that included religion.371 And indeed, 
when Connecticut finally forbade church taxes and ended its establishment a 
few years later, Baptists in that state followed their counterparts elsewhere. 
In 1820, they took the money that had been provided under the 1816 act, now 
free of the prior restriction, and applied the funds to support their schools.372 
Earmarks were a common feature of traditional church taxes. But the 
evidence indicates that members of the Founding generation viewed that 
point with some complexity. The decision to designate taxes at the point of 
collection for use by a religious entity was not in itself enough to make the 
tax a coerced tithe, at least where the appropriation was provided for a public 
purpose like education. Likewise, although it is unclear whether taxes lacking 
earmarks at collection could also be viewed as coerced tithes, some at the 
Founding spoke about these schemes in similar terms where the funds were 
appropriated solely to finance religious worship. 
B. The Role of Individual Coercion 
In addition to earmarked taxes, virtually all church tax schemes at the 
Founding involved some form of individual coercion. In Massachusetts, for 
instance, church taxes were assessed on all eligible citizens, and failure to pay 
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resulted in fines or imprisonment.373 The same was true in Anglican colonies 
like Virginia.374 Here too, however, the evidence suggests that although 
coercion played an important role in identifying church taxes, it was decisive 
only when joined with other considerations. 
The first important observation is a simple one: the mere fact that funds 
obtained through coercion were given to religious entities did not trigger an 
objection—either about coerced tithing or anything else. As we have already 
observed, virtually every state that had ended church taxes in the decade 
before or after the ratification of the Establishment Clause provided 
government funds to religious schools. Some of these—like Virginia and 
Maryland—supported those schools through mandatory fees on common 
activities or through the sale of property acquired through taxation.375 Other 
states like New York, North Carolina, or Pennsylvania funded religious 
schools through direct property taxes or similar forms of taxation, which were 
undoubtedly coercive.376 And some entities like the federal government used 
a combination of these measures.377 Taken at face value, those facts point 
toward a straightforward conclusion. Where funds were given to religious 
entities in support of a good like education, the fact that the money was 
acquired through coercion was not enough to make it a church tax. 
But what about instances where resources actually were given for the 
exclusive purpose of supporting religious worship, but the coercive element was 
loosened or done away with entirely? Here, the evidence is clear on one point 
and less clear on another. 
The clearer point is that proponents of religious liberty maintained their 
objections to tax schemes aimed exclusively at financing religion even when 
those schemes contained opt-outs or exemptions. General assessment 
proposals like those in Virginia or Maryland attempted to lessen the coercive 
element in church taxes by allowing citizens to support education or the poor 
rather than churches if they opted to do so. As noted above, however, those 
adjustments were inadequate to blunt the objection that these schemes 
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mandate a coerced tithe.378 That conclusion may have rested in part on the 
belief that the opt-outs were not always genuine alternatives.379 But the more 
basic point seems to have been that—whether church taxes contained 
exemptions or not—they still assumed that government had the power to 
compel people to pay money solely to finance religious functions. And 
because payments given exclusively to support religion had always been 
viewed as an act of worship, government lacked the power to require them 
just as it lacked the power to compel other religious observances. 
The more complicated problem was schemes that provided state resources 
solely to finance religion but did so without any coercion whatever. And by 
far, the most significant issue on that score was land grants to churches. 
Land grants had long been a feature of traditional religious 
establishments. Glebe lands were mandated by Anglican canon law and 
similar lands had long been provided in New England townships.380 The 
purpose of these grants was to provide not just space for a parsonage or 
church, but also a perpetual source of revenue to fund the minister’s salary or 
the maintenance of worship spaces.381 In at least some states, these land grants 
continued after church taxes had been outlawed.382 But they were also a 
matter of some debate. Understanding that debate provides a final insight 
into the nature of the argument that church taxes were a coerced observance. 
One early skirmish took place in the Continental Congress. In 1785, 
Congress considered a bill organizing lands in the Northwest Territory. The 
bill, which eventually became known as the Land Ordinance of 1785, included 
a provision requiring that one section of each township would be reserved for 
a local school, and another “for the support of religion.”383 It further stated 
that “[t]he profits arising therefrom in both instances [were] to be applied for 
ever according to the will of the majority of male residents of full age.”384 The 
school provision passed without incident.385 But the religion provision was 
more controversial. 
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Beginning the discussion, Charles Pinkney of South Carolina made a 
motion to delete the phrase “for the support of religion,” and replace it with 
“for religious and charitable uses.”386 William Ellery of Rhode Island followed 
up by making a more notable motion. Ellery moved to delete the phrase 
“religious and,” which would have left the land grant only for “charitable 
uses.”387 The motion failed. But immediately after, Ellery made another 
motion to delete entirely the paragraph providing land reserved for 
religion.388 There was no reason to expect a different result on the merits. But 
through clever phrasing, the question calling Ellery’s second motion made 
deletion the default option: “[S]hall the former part stand?”389 And because 
the provision failed to receive the support of the seven states required for 
passage, the language regarding religion was struck.390 
The deletion of the religion provision from the Land Ordinance of 1785 
was not the result of widespread disapproval. The actual vote count on 
retaining the grant was seventeen representatives in favor, six against.391 But 
the matter seems to have been far from resolved. In 1787, the final version of 
the Northwest Ordinance again consciously rejected the idea that townships 
be required to reserve parcels exclusively for the support of religion.392 Yet 
two individual contracts created roughly contemporaneously with the 
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Ordinance required land be set aside for religion in townships covered by 
those purchases.393 After 1794, however, no other federal contract did so.394 
The fact that land grants for churches appear to have been a subject of 
some confusion is not surprising. Perhaps the most important argument 
against church taxes was that those taxes mandated a coerced religious 
offering—a sacrifice of one’s property solely to finance religious worship. But 
land grants were not readily susceptible to that objection. Such grants did not 
force any citizen to part with personal resources to support worship. Instead, 
they simply provided a share of existing government resources for those 
purposes. But proponents of religious liberty were hardly content to leave the 
matter there. And again, probably the most important evidence of their views 
comes from Connecticut. 
In 1793, less than a decade after the debate over the land ordinances in 
Congress, Connecticut enacted a law that raised similar issues. The law 
declared that all funds collected from the sale of the state’s western lands be 
appropriated to “the several Ecclesiastical Societies, Churches, or 
Congregations of all denominations” to support “their respective Ministers 
or Preachers of the Gospel, and Schools of Education.”395 Eventually, the law 
was amended to allow local majorities within each township to determine 
whether the money was to be “applied to the Support of the Worship and 
Ministry,” or only for “the Support of Schools.”396 
In arguing in favor of the western lands law, its supporters observed the 
important difference between traditional church taxes and proceeds from land 
sales. Unlike church taxes, money from land sales would be “a free donation 
from the state,” and thus acceptable even to “those denominations of 
[C]hristians whose principles forbid their having recourse to the civil arm to 
compel individuals . . . to contribute to the support of religion.”397 
Proponents of religious liberty—especially the state’s Baptists and 
Methodists—rejected that argument. But they could not fully deny its force. 
One author, writing under the pseudonym “Farmer,” exemplified the 
dissenters’ position.398 He began by noting that funding for schools was 
 
393 See Ariens, supra note 390, at 254-55 (describing how these contracts required reserving 
ministerial lands). 
394 Smith, supra note 391, at 592 (“The provision for religion in the Symmes tract was the last 
one to be included in a land grant from the federal government.”); see also Ariens, supra note 390, at 
255 (noting that Washington signed the Symmes patent, the second of the two agreements, in 1794). 
395 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 968 (providing the text of the law prior to amendment). 
396 See CONN. COURANT, Nov. 3, 1794 (quoting an earlier version of 1795 Conn. Pub. Acts 
487); see also 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 969 (describing the amendment and the public 
debate surrounding it). 
397 2 MCLOUGHLIN, supra note 125, at 973 (quoting CONN. COURANT, Mar. 16, 1795). 
398 Id. at 972 (identifying Farmer as exemplifying “[t]he stand of the Baptists and other 
dissenters on the Western Lands Act”). 
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indeed a “desirable object,” and one that he had no qualms about 
supporting.399 The problem was “solely . . . [the law’s] making provisions for 
the perpetual support of ministers and teachers of the gospel,” which was 
objectionable because “[i]t is no part of the duty or business of civil rulers . . . 
to make provision out of the property of the state” for such purposes.400 In so 
arguing, however, Farmer did not explicitly claim that the Western Lands Act 
required a coerced religious observance.401 Rather, he appealed to other 
adjacent arguments. “[T]he Divine author . . . [never] left on record any 
injunction . . . that the gospel or its ministers were committed to the trust or 
recommended to the care of civil rulers.”402 The state was “neither qualified 
nor authorized” to make judgments concerning religious truth or those 
properly suited to preach it.403 Such support would corrupt “the purity of the 
original institution as taught and exemplified in the gospel” by making 
support dependent on a magistrate’s approval.404 Noncoercive support 
provided by land sales probably could not be said to require a religious 
sacrifice on the part of individual citizens. But it was still objectionable 
because it provided public property solely to support religious functions: “[I]t 
is generally admitted that considered simply as being ministers of the gospel, 
it is not the proper duty of civil rulers . . . to provide them support from the 
property of the state.”405 And indeed, that same conviction seems to have been 
at the heart of a final important controversy over land grants a few years later, 
this one again in Congress. 
In 1809, Baptists in the Mississippi Territory wrote a letter to Congress 
requesting that it secure for them a parcel of land.406 The letter explained that 
they had built a church on land belonging to the United States, only to realize 
that the only means to secure this land was through a “public sale.”407 The 
church worried that being forced to purchase the land this way “might subject 
us to pay, not only the value of the land, but a considerable part of the value 
of the [church],” or at the very least force it to purchase a much bigger parcel 
than it needed.408 Notably, the Baptists stopped short of asking for a 
 
399 ”Farmer,” Messi’rs Printers, CONN. COURANT, May 11, 1795. 
400 Id. 
401 However, he did note that in general “a christian . . . is obliged to contribute to the support 
of that wherein he thinks christianity to consist,” and that “civil rulers [cannot] absolve him from 





406 Application of a Committee of the Baptist Church at Salem, Mississippi, for the Land on 
Which the Church Stands (Jan. 7, 1809), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MISCELLANEOUS 11, 11 (Walter Lowrie & Walter S. Franklin eds., 1834). 
407 Id. 
408 Id. 
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donation. Instead, the church asked Congress to pass a law “to secure us [the] 
land, and on such terms as you in your wisdom may think proper.”409 
Congress responded by including the church in a bill which reserved the 
relevant five acres of land “for the use of the Baptist church.”410 James 
Madison, now serving as President, vetoed the bill, declaring that it 
“comprise[d] a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the 
United States, for the use and support of religious societies, contrary to the 
article of the constitution which declares that Congress shall make no law 
respecting a religious establishment.”411 
Madison did not explain the reasons underlying his conclusion. But it 
seems likely that he viewed the matter just as Baptists and other religious 
dissenters in Connecticut did. Providing land solely to support a church’s 
worship did not involve individual coercion, and thus may not have been 
comparable to a compulsory tithe. But it still risked setting a dangerous 
precedent that the United States had power to appropriate property for the 
exclusive purpose of financing religion. That objection apparently did not 
apply to religious schools, at least if Madison’s behavior is any indication.412 
But it applied to land grants given exclusively to support a church as a church, 
even if those grants did not involve coercing anyone. 
Individual coercion was a hallmark of most church tax schemes. Yet as 
with earmarks, the element of coercion appears to have been neither 
necessary nor sufficient to trigger objections. Many states and the federal 
government supported religious schools with various forms of coercive 
taxation, but those programs seem to have been accepted without objection. 
Likewise, although supporters of religious liberty conspicuously avoided 
claiming that programs like land grants for churches could be compared to 
coerced tithes, they nonetheless objected to these schemes where they aimed 
solely to finance religious functions. At a more general level, however, the 
fact that this issue was relatively unsettled provides further reason think that 




410 Id. at 154. 
411 President Madison’s Objections to the “Bill for the Relief of Richard Tervin, William 
Coleman, Edwin Lewis, Samuel Mims, Joseph Wilson, and the Baptist Church at Salem Meeting-
House, in the Mississippi Territory” (Feb. 28, 1811), reprinted in 2 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: 
MISCELLANEOUS, supra note 406, at 154, 154. 
412 As Nathan Chapman has noted, during Madison’s administration the government’s 
partnerships with missionary schools among the Native American tribes actually increased. See 
Chapman, supra note 337, at 9. 
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IV. SUMMARY OF THE EVIDENCE AND IMPLICATIONS 
The history described above lacks clarity at certain points. In many states, 
there is only limited evidence about how ordinary citizens thought about 
church taxes or distinguished them from other kinds of funding schemes. 
Moreover, although the views of Baptists and other proponents of religious 
liberty can be known with more clarity, it is unclear how widely their more 
radical objections—especially to things like chaplains or land grants—were 
shared among their contemporaries. Yet even acknowledging these limits, the 
evidence considered above suggests several conclusions that can be stated 
with some confidence. It is worth briefly discussing what the history allows 
us to say before discussing its implications. 
The first issue the history clarifies is the basic terms of the debate. As the 
evidence from places like Virginia, Massachusetts, and Maryland suggests, 
both opponents and supporters of church taxes generally agreed that 
government could not require citizens to engage in particular forms of 
religious worship. They did not agree, however, about whether that truism 
also applied to church taxes. 
Proponents of church taxes argued that so long as those schemes did not 
explicitly favor one church or leave dissenters with no choice about where 
their funds were directed, they were acceptable. Supporters of religious 
freedom like James Madison, Isaac Backus, and others responded by asserting 
that those defenses missed the point. By requiring payments from citizens 
specifically designed to finance religious worship, church taxes required each 
person to make a sacrifice to God. And as a result, they reasoned, those taxes 
exceeded government’s rightful authority regardless of whether they 
supported one church or many, and regardless of whether they built in 
exemptions or other kinds of allowances for dissenters. In later years, 
supporters of religious liberty extended their objection to schemes involving 
general taxes and land grants for churches. But these were skirmishes that 
arose out of the main issue. For the Founding generation, the key question 
seems to have been whether church taxes were a coerced religious observance 
and thus an improper form of religious establishment. 
The second thing the history makes clear involves the scope of the 
objection. In states that had never collected church taxes like Pennsylvania or 
those that had ended the practice like Virginia, legislatures ceased providing 
money solely to support religious functions. But the same was not true of 
funding given to religious institutions for other reasons. 
In every single state that rejected church taxes between 1776 and the 
decade after the Establishment Clause was ratified, churches and other 
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religious institutions eventually received public money for education.413 The 
same was true of the federal government and actors under its control who 
funded religious education in the District of Columbia and other missionary 
schools for almost a century after the adoption of the Establishment Clause. 
We cannot know for certain why supporters of religious liberty objected to 
church taxes but did not object to that practice. But very likely, they believed 
that providing taxpayer funds solely to finance worship was a coerced tithe, 
but the same was not true of programs providing funding for other reasons. 
That theory tracks the arguments made by supporters of religious freedom 
like Madison and Backus, and it links those arguments to widespread practice 
in this period. It also explains why even Baptists and Quakers actively sought 
such funds for their own schools while simultaneously opposing church taxes. 
Churches were not to receive public money solely to support their worship, 
because such funding essentially required each citizen to make a religious 
offering. But the same was not true of funding for things like education, even 
if beneficiaries used some of the funds for religion. 
The third thing the history illuminates concerns the no-aid theory. As the 
foregoing indicates, funding for religious schools during the Founding period 
was virtually ubiquitous in states that ended church taxes, and the same was 
true at the federal level for decades after the Establishment Clause was 
ratified. And given those facts, one might wonder: if the no-aid theory is so 
hard to reconcile with the evidence, why have so many people endorsed it as 
a proper reading of history? 
The answer has to do with a key ambiguity at the heart of the theory. In 
Everson, Justice Black said that the historical evidence demonstrated that 
because citizens cannot be forced to pay for religion they oppose, “[n]o tax in 
any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or 
institutions.”414 In one sense, that statement is absolutely accurate. In 
rejecting church taxes, citizens at the Founding agreed that government had 
no power to levy taxes “to support” religious activity, at least where “support” 
is construed to mean “provide targeted funding for the religious function of 
churches and ministers.” The error was in assuming that limitation also 
applied to programs in which support for religion was incidental to some 
other good. For the Founding generation, funding for religious schools did 
not ‘support’ religion in a way that was prohibited, in all likelihood because 
such programs bore no resemblance to coerced offerings. The no-aid theory 
was close enough to the truth to be plausible. But once the history is 
 
413 Rhode Island banned church taxes in 1716, so is not technically included this group. But the 
practice of Quakers there provides some reason to think a similar attitude may have been present in that 
state too. See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text (noting Quaker efforts to obtain school funding). 
414 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
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understood, it becomes apparent that extending it beyond its original scope—
that is, beyond programs providing special funding for religious worship—
was a major mistake. 
To be sure, one might contest that last point. Supporters of the no-aid 
theory misunderstood the history by assuming that Founding-era sources 
condemned support for religious schools. But it is true that, beginning in the 
1850s and continuing into the early twentieth century, many states amended 
their own constitutions to bar financial support for “sectarian” schools.415 And 
by 1875, people like James Blaine were advocating for a similar constitutional 
amendment at the federal level.416 Thus, even if no one at the Founding 
thought the Establishment Clause or any equivalent state provision forbade 
government funding for religious schools, perhaps the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and subsequent practice made the broad no-aid rule 
part of the Constitution. 
This is not the place to engage in a full-scale discussion about the nature 
of incorporation or the relationship between original meaning and 
subsequent practice. However, two things are worth noting. First, assuming 
one believes the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment extended the 
Constitution’s ban on religious establishment to the states,417 their practice 
suggests that they did not view the Establishment Clause as banning aid to 
religious schools either. During Reconstruction, the Freedmen’s Bureau 
provided tens of thousands of dollars to religious schools, and that was in 
addition to direct money grants provided by Congress itself.418 Moreover, the 
push for a federal constitutional amendment by James Blaine and others 
suggests that most citizens in this period probably did not understand the 
Establishment Clause itself as forbidding funding for religious schools, 
including denominational ones.  
There is also a second point. Even acknowledging that many states 
eventually ended funding for religious schools, there are major questions about 
 
415 The literature describing this transformation is vast. See GLENN, supra note 335, at 154-73 
(describing the conflict between Protestants and Catholics in the 1870s over public funding for 
religious schools, and the eventual legislative push to end public funding for religious schools); LLOYD 
P. JORGENSON, THE STATE AND THE NON-PUBLIC SCHOOL: 1825–1925, at 69-145 (1987) 
(describing how conflict between Catholics and Protestants, in the absence of a federal ban on funding 
sectarian schools, led to mobilization in the States to take funding away from denominational schools 
in order to defund Catholic schools). 
416 See GLENN, supra note 335, at 168-73 (discussing the anti-Catholic history of the “Blaine 
Amendments” and explaining how action on the no-aid theory shifted from the federal to state level). 
417 See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The Rise of the 
Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. STATE L.J. 1085, 1150 (1995) (arguing that in the period 
surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment “the Establishment Clause was understood 
as the substantive equal of the Free Exercise Clause, and . . . the principle of nonestablishment 
applied at both the state and federal level”). 
418 See GABEL, supra note 98, at 512-21 (describing these expenditures). 
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how seriously that practice should be taken as informing the Constitution’s 
meaning. As the Espinoza majority pointed out, the claim that government 
funding for religious schools was unconstitutional arose out of intense 
Protestant-Catholic conflict.419 More specifically, it arose out of a desire on the 
part of Protestants to deny funding to Catholic schools while retaining state 
support for common schools which were unabashedly and self-consciously 
Protestant.420 One could argue this discriminatory context should not color 
the history as a whole.421 But doing so requires explaining why a practice with 
such a dubious pedigree ought to trump pervasive Founding-era evidence, 
arguably rooted in clear principle, that funding for religious education is 
permissible. And assuming that Founding-era history is controlling—as every 
member of the Supreme Court has to at least some degree—that history 
contains several important implications for modern doctrine.422 
The most obvious implication relates to the basic orientation of the Court’s 
jurisprudence. Recently, several Justices insisted that the Court’s modern 
emphasis on neutrality in its funding jurisprudence has “no basis in the history 
to which the Court has repeatedly turned to inform its understanding of the 
Establishment Clause.”423 And numerous scholars have made similar 
assertions.424 But the foregoing history suggests a different conclusion. 
For proponents of religious liberty at the Founding, church taxes were 
objectionable because their exclusive aim was financing worship, which made 
them indistinguishable from a coerced tithe. But the same objection did not 
apply when funds were provided to religious entities for other reasons, most 
notably for education. On the contrary, where the government’s interest in 
providing funding rested on something other than financing religion for its 
 
419 140 S. Ct. 2246, 2258-59 (2020). 
420 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 145-46 (describing this history); see also John C. Jeffries & 
James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279, 300-05 (2001) 
(concluding that “religious rivalry and anti-Catholic prejudice” was a “prominent” factor in state 
bans on aid to religious schools). For a more expansive account, see PHILIP HAMBURGER, 
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 193-335 (2002). The Court acknowledged this same fact in 
Espinoza. See 140 S. Ct. at 2259 (noting the “checkered tradition” of denying funding to religious 
schools, and that both the Blaine Amendment and “many of its state counterparts” arose out of 
“pervasive hostility to the Catholic Church and to Catholics in general” (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
421 See Steven K. Green, The Insignificance of the Blaine Amendment, 2008 BYU L. REV. 295, 295-
99 (2008) (admitting that historians have characterized the Blaine Amendment as discriminatory but 
arguing that there was an understood “prohibition on state funding of religious education” before the 
Amendment); see also STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE SCHOOL AND THE CONSTITUTION 
225-36 (2012) (advancing a similar argument). 
422 See generally Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2258-59 (2020) (discussing Founding-era history); id. at 
2285-87 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same); id. at 2296-97 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (same). 
423 Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2030-31 (2017) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
424 See supra notes 20–23 and accompanying text. 
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own sake, even the most extreme advocates of religious liberty viewed it as 
wholly unobjectionable. And under modern conditions, that view leads to 
“neutral” treatment between secular and religious recipients as a matter of 
course. Where government provides funds to pay for public goods rather than 
solely to finance religion, it will necessarily treat religious and secular entities 
receiving those funds similarly as a matter of course. Contrary to at least some 
modern rhetoric, Founding-era history does not contradict the Court’s 
modern funding jurisprudence. On the contrary, it vindicates the doctrine in 
its major respects, though it does so indirectly. 
Yet if the history largely justifies the general direction of the Court’s 
jurisprudence, it does not always justify the specific choices the Court has 
made. One example involves rules about direct funding given to religious 
recipients. In Mitchell v. Helms, Justice O’Connor insisted that although 
religious entities can receive direct aid to further secular goods, the 
Establishment Clause demands those funds be strictly confined so they are 
not diverted to anything religious.425 The Court in Espinoza left that principle 
undisturbed, at least for now.426 But if the foregoing history is accurate, that 
limitation was erroneous. As the evidence suggests, for members of the 
Founding generation who opposed church taxes, it was not the use of the 
money in isolation that mattered. What mattered was whether money was 
offered to religious entities in support of some public aim rather than simply 
to finance religion.427 Where such funding was given in support of a good like 
education, specific decisions about the use of those funds by beneficiaries 
appear to have been irrelevant. The focus on the use of government dollars 
apart from a program’s larger purpose is a holdover from the no-aid theory, 
not a reflection of Founding-era history. 
A version of the same corrective could be offered in other areas. School 
vouchers are a good example. In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the Court 
concluded that a voucher program providing money for parents to send their 
children to either religious or secular schools did not violate the 
 
425 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 838-44 (2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (arguing that “actual diversion of government aid to religious indoctrination” is forbidden 
under the Establishment Clause, even where a program distributes funds to religious and secular 
recipients on a neutral basis). 
426 See Espinoza, 140 S. Ct. at 2254 (noting that under the scholarship program at issue, money 
“makes its way to religious schools only as a result of Montanans independently choosing to spend 
their scholarships at such schools” by donating to private scholarships supporting those schools). 
427 For a sampling of other historical sources making a similar point, see Stephanie H. Barclay, 
Brady Earley, & Annika Boone, Original Meaning and the Establishment Clause: A Corpus Linguistics 
Analysis, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 505, 550-51 (2019). As the authors observe, the sources do not identify 
“neutral forms of government financial support for religious organizations . . . as a characteristic of 
establishment.” Id. at 551. 
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Establishment Clause.428 In so holding, the Court stressed—consistent with 
the history above—that the program was constitutional in part because it was 
demonstrably neutral as to religion: it offered money without “deliberately 
skew[ing] incentives toward religious schools.”429 Yet the Court also said that 
because the program funded religious activity, it was important that the funds 
be channeled through “individual recipients” like parents.430 That latter 
ruling was an unconvincing formalism and has been rightly criticized as 
constitutional money laundering.431 But in truth, the problem was not Zelman 
itself, but rather the idea that government may never provide funds that 
might also be used by a recipient for something religious. 
As originally understood, the Establishment Clause almost surely did not 
prohibit government from funding religious activity, at least where such 
funding was incidental to furthering some other good. And that fact puts 
Zelman’s talk about private choice in a new light. Creating a program in which 
private individuals exercise ultimate choice about how funds are directed can 
be a good way to display that the government is acting neutrally with respect 
to religion. But the history indicates it is certainly not required. The question 
is whether a funding program aims at something other than financing religion 
for its own sake, not whether government dollars might be used for something 
religious along the way. 
To be sure, there are complications lurking here. The most obvious one 
involves programs that employ formally neutral criteria but use them as a 
gerrymander to channel money to the government’s favored religious 
recipients. That danger is especially acute where a program employs vague or 
highly discretionary criteria, which might allow officials to favor or disfavor 
specific religious activities or viewpoints.432 There were at least accusations 
that George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiative which provided funds for the 
social service activities of religious groups had this problem,433 and one could 
imagine other examples too. 
 
428 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 644 (2002). 
429 Id. at 650. 
430 Id. at 652. 
431 See, e.g., Laura S. Underkuffler, Vouchers and Beyond: The Individual as Causative Agent in 
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 IND. L. J. 167, 187-91 (2000) (insisting that the Court’s reasoning 
in Zelman suggests that “money can simply be laundered through ‘private choice’ as a way to avoid 
Establishment Clause guarantees”). For a nuanced examination of the money-laundering objection 
in relation to Zelman specifically, see Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Zelman’s Future: Vouchers, 
Sectarian Providers, and the Next Round of Constitutional Battles, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 917, 935-
47 (2003), in which the authors explain that the Zelman majority very likely retained this 
requirement to attract Justice O’Connor’s vote). 
432 See Thomas C. Berg & Douglas Laycock, Espinoza, Government Funding, and Religious Choice, 
36 J.L. & RELIGION (forthcoming 2020) (manuscript at 14), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3680167 (“The 
more discretionary the criteria, the greater the risk of discrimination in the award of funds . . . .”). 
433 See Laycock, supra note 13, at 156-57, 157 n.176 (collecting and describing these complaints). 
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The Founders did not deal with the problem of gerrymandered funding 
schemes specifically, though they did sometimes contend that schemes like 
general assessments were attempts to shore up one church’s dominance.434 
Here again, however, a comparison to historic church tax regimes is a helpful 
starting place. As we have already observed, church taxes schemes and their 
analogues provided funds solely to finance a religious function. Even at the 
Founding, however, those schemes were the exception. Funding for religious 
schools existed in every state that had ended church taxes, and as far as I am 
aware, none of those programs were accused of being a covert attempt to 
finance worship. On the contrary, other than New York’s controversial moves 
to end funding for denominational education, those programs did not 
formally recognize the religious practice of recipients at all. 
The same will likely be true of most programs today. When religious 
entities are included in funding programs for homeless shelters, scholarship 
programs, or historic preservation grants, the law does not take account of 
their religious practice. It cares about the services they provide, and the 
programs are structured to get the government its money’s worth. And where 
those programs rely on relatively objective criteria, any differences in funding 
will usually be traceable to factors like the availability of providers in a 
particular area or the quality of the services rendered. To be sure, there may 
be outliers, and courts should be on the lookout for them. But unless the 
decision to fund is explainable only in terms of religion—that is, unless the 
evidence of religious bias demonstrates that the program is effectively a 
church tax in disguise—comparing a funding scheme to a compulsory tithe 
or anything like it is not very credible. 
The history also has also another implication, this one concerning the 
mechanics of litigation. For purposes of Article III standing, the Court has 
treated Establishment Clause claims as an exception to the rule against 
“taxpayer standing,” based on the erroneous conclusion that Madison thought 
the Clause would be violated anytime beneficiaries used taxpayer funds “to 
aid religion.”435 But again, the history above offers some help. 
If the proper rule is that government may not provide funds solely to 
finance religious functions, the Court would have two options. On the one 
hand, it could retain broad taxpayer standing and instruct lower courts to 
dispose of cases at the motion to dismiss stage in light of the correct 
substantive rule. That strategy would reflect the belief—arguably held by at 
 
434 See, e.g., CURRY, supra note 53, at 147 (observing that opponents of the general assessment 
in Virginia saw the scheme as “merely a covert way of aiding the Anglican Church”); see also “A 
Christian,” Messrs. Goddard and Langworthy, MD. J. & BALT. ADVERTISER, May 17, 1785 (speculating 
that Maryland’s general assessment was a plot to prop up the Anglican Church). 
435 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 103-04 (1968) (describing Madison’s concerns and the 
current test for taxpayer standing). 
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least some at the Founding—that money given exclusively to support a 
religious function is comparable to a coerced tithe even when it originates 
from a general tax.436 But just as sensibly, the Court could also limit standing 
solely to entities that have actually been denied funds under a program (rather 
than extending it to any aggrieved taxpayer). That approach would probably 
enforce the rule just as well, since it seems unlikely a program designed 
exclusively to finance religion could do so without excluding beneficiaries 
who would otherwise be entitled to support.437 Either strategy would capture 
the spirit of Founding-era views about funding for religion, and either would 
help bring an end to the mischief of the Court’s earlier jurisprudence. 
There is one final point worth discussing. If the Constitution does not 
affirmatively forbid allowing beneficiaries to use money for religious activity, 
does it have anything to say about a government’s choice to embrace that 
restriction of its own accord? Even if the government may enact neutral 
programs that convey funds to religious recipients without restricting their 
use, could a state choose to exclude beneficiaries engaged in religious activity 
as a policy choice? 
Answering that question involves two different considerations. The first 
has to do with justifications for a refusal to fund. In Locke v. Davey, the 
Supreme Court held that a state could exclude a student from a scholarship 
program because he chose to major in devotional theology.438 According to 
the Court, that exclusion was permissible in part because a theology degree 
is about training to be a minister, and the Founding generation “prohibited 
any tax dollars from supporting the clergy.”439 Yet as the foregoing suggests, 
that reading of the history was very likely incorrect. 
Proponents of religious freedom at the founding objected to support for 
ministers “under that name”440 or “in the Pursuit of religious Duties.”441 But 
they did not object to funding ministers or churches in pursuit of public 
goods. On the contrary, New York provided tax money directly to churches 
of all kinds to fund their free schools, and the same was true in Maryland, 
 
436 See supra notes 345–368 and accompanying text (describing these objections). At a 
minimum, however, the historical evidence suggests that where a funding scheme lacks any kind of 
individual coercion it probably cannot be compared to a coerced tithe provided by taxpayers. The 
modern Supreme Court has reasoned similarly. See Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 563 
U.S. 125, 142 (2011) (holding taxpayers have standing when a funding program involves the 
expenditure of taxes taken by coercion, but not when it involves tax credits). 
437 For one thoughtful argument that the Court’s approach to Article III standing under the 
Establishment Clause has been misguided, see Richard W. Garnett, Standing, Spending, and 
Separation: How the No-Establishment Rule Does (and Does Not) Protect Conscience, 54 VILL. L. REV. 
655 (2009). 
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New Jersey, Delaware, and Pennsylvania.442 Moreover, the Court’s insistence 
that the problem in Locke involved funding for an “essentially religious 
endeavor” is true only if one focuses on the use of money by a single 
beneficiary while ignoring the scholarship program itself.443 Were a state to 
enact a program whose sole ambition was to fund ministerial training or 
religious worship, there is no doubt it would be unconstitutional. But that 
limitation does not apply to programs that fund schools, soup kitchens, or 
university scholarships and are available to religious and nonreligious 
recipients like the program in Locke. A state may have many legitimate 
reasons for limiting funding. But history provides little support for the idea 
that restrictions on religious use can be justified as flowing from 
“antiestablishment interests” with a Founding-era pedigree.444 
The second point concerns the obligation to fund itself. The history above 
contains limited evidence about whether the founding generation thought 
government has a responsibility to fund religious entities when it chooses to 
fund secular ones. But that should not be surprising. Apart from modest 
funding for schools, the government funded almost nothing in the private 
sector in this period, making selective funding claims rare by default.445 
Moreover, although Founding-era views are broadly consistent with the 
Court’s modern framework, the Founding generation itself did not actually 
employ a conceptual framework calling for “neutrality” between religious and 
secular recipients. Nonetheless, the historical record offers at least some 
reason to think that cases like Espinoza are broadly consistent with the 
Founding-era understanding. 
Most notably, where religious entities at the Founding were excluded 
from otherwise available funding solely because of their religious activity, 
they protested vigorously. In the debate over school funds in Georgetown, 
the city official speaking in favor of the city’s Catholics expressed concern 
over “any portion of our citizens [being] excluded from a just participation of 
any investment of the public funds in consequence of a peculiarity of religious 
 
442 See supra notes 269–275 and accompanying text (New York); supra notes 234-241 and 
accompanying text (Maryland); supra notes 285-290 and accompanying text (New Jersey and 
Delaware); supra notes 291-298 and accompanying text (Pennsylvania). 
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Wash. Dep’t of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986) (holding that the Establishment Clause 
did not bar a blind student from using state-scholarship funds to attend a bible college and train to 
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444 See Locke, 540 U.S. at 722 (justifying a theology student’s exclusion from an otherwise 
available scholarship program on the basis of “antiestablishment interests” grounded in history). 
445 Laycock, supra note 13, at 142 (noting the paucity of government funding programs in the 
Founding era). 
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faith.”446 Likewise, in New York, the Congregation of Shearith Israel went so 
far as to say that such discrimination violated “the liberal spirit of our 
constitution, which recognizes no distinction in religious worship.”447 In both 
instances, religious minorities confronted with selective funding argued that 
such exclusions were unjust or even unconstitutional. And in both instances, 
their views prevailed. 
To be sure, these historical examples might be distinguishable from the 
modern cases. After all, they involve selective funding for other religious schools, 
not the decision to fund only secular ones. But the logic of the Founding-era 
arguments seems to apply with equal force to the latter context too. 
Funding for religious schools did not fall within the Founding-era 
objection to church taxes, likely because such funding was not provided for 
the exclusive purpose of financing religion. Instead, many Founding-era 
citizens thought it was denying funding for schools solely because of their 
religion activity that was prohibited. Part of the rationale for that conclusion 
was the belief that such denials functioned as a penalty on religious practice—
they deprived citizens of “a just participation of . . . investment of the public 
funds in consequence of . . . religious faith” as the official in Georgetown put 
it.448 But even more, the idea that government could not exclude citizens from 
benefits solely on the basis of religious activity was just the flip side of the 
objection to church taxes. Just as government could not extract funds 
exclusively for a religious function, neither could it withhold funds provided 
for other purposes solely because of religion. And that principle seems to 
apply just as readily to programs that categorically exclude all religious 
recipients rather than just recipients of a particular faith. 
What is more, Jefferson’s correspondence with the Catholic nuns in New 
Orleans provides reason to think the federal Constitution contained the same 
principle.449 Recall that, following the Louisiana Purchase, the nuns wrote to 
Jefferson to inquire whether their school—which now arguably rested on 
property belonging to the United States—would be allowed to continue. 
Jefferson responded by assuring them that the “principles of the constitution” 
confirmed that their school was “ensure[ed] . . . the patronage of the 
government” for its public service, “whatever diversity of shade may appear 
in the religious opinions of our fellow citizens.”450 If the property of the New 
Orleans school had actually passed to the United States, allowing the nuns to 
use it was a form of government subsidy. Yet here too, Jefferson suggested 
 
446 See WARNER, supra note 314, at 77. 
447 See The Memorial of the Trustees of the Congregation of Sheerith Israel Convened, supra 
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that federal assistance for the Catholic school’s “charitable objects” was 
perfectly permissible.451 But even more than that, he also strongly implied 
that the “principles of the constitution” indicated that the federal government 
could not discontinue that subsidy solely because of a disagreement with the 
nuns’ “religious opinions.”452 Again, the point seems the same as that offered 
by Shearith Israel in New York and Catholics in Georgetown, now applied to 
the federal constitution. According to Jefferson, at least, the First 
Amendment prohibited denying otherwise available benefits where the sole 
reason was religion, just as it prohibited extracting funds where the sole 
reason was religion. 
CONCLUSION 
No one likes paying for causes they find objectionable. But for the 
Founders, that was not the starting place for managing our differences, even 
our differences around religion. In 1790, George Washington wrote a letter to 
Shearith Israel and America’s other Jewish congregations in which he 
observed: “The liberality of sentiment toward each other which marks every 
political and religious denomination of men in this Country, stands 
unparalleled in the history of Nations.”453 And indeed, it was liberality that 
defined the attitude of the Founding generation toward funding for things 
like schools. For them as for us today, religious disagreement was a source of 
division. But without more, disagreement itself was not a limitation on the 
government’s ability to support the public good. 
On the best reading of the evidence, the Founders forbade government 
from deploying tax money or other public resources where the sole ambition 
was to finance religious worship. That conviction flowed from the idea that 
government could not coerce anyone to tithe, even to support one’s own faith. 
But where no such ambition was present, it was Washington’s sentiment that 
prevailed. To be sure, these Americans were not perfect in carrying out their 
commitment to religious freedom. To their credit, however, they largely 
agreed that when it came to goods like education or provision for the poor, it 
was cooperation—not ‘no aid’—that defined the country they founded. And 
if historical practices and understandings are to guide our interpretation of 
the Religion Clauses, that liberal sentiment is still the rule today. 
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